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Article

Labor’s Soft Means and Hard Challenges:
Fundamental Discrepancies and the
Promise of Non-Binding Arbitration for
International Framework Agreements
César F. Rosado Marzán

†

INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR A GLOBAL
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
International framework agreements (IFAs) are agreements in which multinational companies and global union federations (“global unions”) pledge to abide by the “core labor
standards” of the International Labor Organization (ILO), to
wit, freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining, elimination of all forms of forced
or compulsory labor, effective abolition of child labor, and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupa1
tion. Global union federations (“global unions”) are labor organizations composed of national labor organizations, normally
2
categorized by industry groups. IFAs today cover almost nine
† Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The research reported in this article was part of the Regulating Markets and Labour Programme (ReMarkLab) funded by the Swedish Council for Working Life and
Social Research and the Institute for Social Private Law, Stockholm University. The article has benefitted from comments made at workshops and conferences at the Institute for Social Private Law of Stockholm University, the
University of North Carolina School of Law, and the University of Minnesota
Law School. The author thanks Kerstin Ahlberg, Matthew Finkin, Niklas
Bruun, John F. Coyle, Marty H. Malin and Joan E. Steinman. The author also
would like to thank Laura Caringella, Meron Kebede, and the editorial team of
the Minnesota Law Review. Any errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author. Direct all inquiries to crosado@kentlaw.iit.edu. Copyright © 2014 by César F. Rosado Marzán.
1. Konstantinos Papadakis, Introduction to SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS 1, 2
& 17 n.1 (Konstantinos Papadakis ed., 2011).
2. To date there are eleven global unions representing workers from different global industries. See About Us, GLOBAL UNIONS, http://global-unions
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million workers around the world, excluding contractors. The
legal status and judicial enforceability of most of these agree4
ments is yet an open question. IFAs, or at least most of them,
5
are considered to be “soft law” instruments.
IFAs are global unions’ bilateral and negotiated response
6
to unilateral corporate codes of conduct. They may also provide
global unions with a new institutional role to play in the global
economy. At least one major study of union density has argued
that without a global institutional framework for labor relations, labor union density—the rate of the wage and salaried
7
workforce of a country that is member of a labor union —will
8
continue to decline in the developed, capitalist democracies.
IFAs may be one way to globalize industrial relations and reinvigorate labor.
IFAs are still obscure instruments in the United States.
Therefore, this Article reports on original, exploratory field research by the author to better illuminate what these instruments are about and what challenges possibly lay ahead for
IFAs. The research uncovered that parties and other IFA
stakeholders may disagree over the meaning of fundamental
9
terms of their IFAs. Disagreements can become obstacles that
stall the agreements and the construction of an international
industrial relations system.
.org/about-us.html?lang=en (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). The website defines
global unions as:
Global Unions are international trade union organisations working
together with a shared commitment to the ideals and principles of the
trade union movement. They share a common determination to organize, to defend human rights and labour standards everywhere, and to
promote the growth of trade unions for the benefit of all working men
and women and their families.
Id.
3. César F. Rosado Marzán, Organizing with International Framework
Agreements: An Exploratory Study, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2231564.
4. See infra Part I.
5. Id.
6. Renée-Claude Drouin, Promoting Fundamental Labor Rights Through
International Framework Agreements: Practical Outcomes and Present Challenges, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 591, 591–95 (2010).
7. See BRUCE WESTERN, BETWEEN CLASS AND MARKET: POSTWAR UNIONIZATION IN THE CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES 24 (1997) (“A common and useful
overall measure of union membership is union density—union membership as
a percentage of the dependent labor force.”).
8. Id. at 195–96.
9. See infra Part III.
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The Article provides one possible solution to resolve IFA
interpretation issues between the signatory parties and other
stakeholders: non-binding arbitration based on ILO norms.
Some commentators of IFAs have explored ways to make IFAs
10
judicially enforceable. However, here the author argues that it
is unlikely that parties are ready to harden their agreements
by making them judicially enforceable. Non-binding arbitration
based on the ILO norms could help to incrementally harden
11
IFAs and resolve interpretation disputes.
The next part of this Article, Part I, details the ascension of
IFAs, why the agreements can help rebuild labor, and why further empirical research is needed to understand the IFAs’ potential. Part II describes the exploratory research that the author undertook to contribute to our knowledge of these rather
obscure and novel agreements. Part III describes the results of
the study. It describes that fundamental disagreements regarding the terms of the IFAs may surface after the IFAs are
signed. Disagreements could be between the signatory parties
and/or other stakeholders, such as national unions represented
by global unions but that were not privy to the IFAs. Such disagreements may endanger IFAs if they cannot be resolved. Part
IV of the Article analyzes what the exploratory field research
uncovered including the disagreements between signatory parties and even signatory parties and other stakeholders. It suggests that parties should include clauses for non-binding arbitration based on ILO norms to resolve interpretation issues in
future and renegotiated IFAs. Further research on how signatory parties and other IFA stakeholders resolve their differences, including the few IFAs that already have arbitration
clauses, can further help us to understand the future promise
of IFAs.
I. THE ASCENSION OF IFAS AND WHY WE NEED TO
KNOW MORE ABOUT THEM
This is my copy of the global agreement. It’s like a bible, man. When
management tells me to get out, I show them this. When workers are
afraid to join, I show them this. When people tell me we don’t have
the right, I point to this. This this this. This is the key. But only if we
12
use it right.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. JAMIE K. MCCALLUM, GLOBAL UNIONS, LOCAL POWER: THE NEW SPIRIT OF TRANSNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZING 118 (2013) (quoting a South African
unionist referring to his IFA with G4S, a multinational security company).
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IFAs are agreements signed by global unions and multina13
tional firms. At a minimum, the parties who sign IFAs pledge
14
to abide by the ILO’s “core labor standards.” Some IFAs may
also include procedures for implementation and provisions con15
cerning suppliers and business partners. Many IFAs also include pledges regarding wages, working hours, workplace safe16
ty, training, and restructurings.
It is uncertain whether any IFAs are legally binding in17
struments. Legal experts have argued that these agreements

13.
14.
15.
16.

Papadakis, supra note 1, at 2.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Drouin, supra note 6, at 593.
See SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, app. at 249–56 tbl. 2.
17. See Alvin L. Goldman, Enforcement of International Framework
Agreements Under U.S. Law, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 605, 632–34 (2012)
(explaining that IFAs could be enforced under U.S. federal labor laws, contract
law, consumer protection laws, and investor protection laws, but noting that
the legal hurdles are very significant); see also INT’L TRAINING CTR. OF THE
INT’L LABOUR ORG., KEY ISSUES FOR MANAGEMENT TO CONSIDER WITH REGARD TO TRANSNATIONAL COMPANY AGREEMENTS (TCAS) 19 (2010), available
at http://lempnet.itcilo.org/en/tcas/admin/final-pub (“The legal status of these
agreements is unclear. They have never been tested in a court of law, so questions remain about their status and enforceability. It is a mistake, though, to
assume that they have no legal status—it has still to be tested.”); Kevin Banks
& Elizabeth Shilton, Corporate Commitments to Freedom of Association: Is
There a Role for Enforcement Under Canadian Law?, 33 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 495, 511–29, 551–53 (2012) (explaining the numerous legal hurdles
that must be overcome to enforce IFAs in Canadian courts under the law of
contracts and labor laws); Sarah Coleman, Enforcing International Framework
Agreements in U.S. Courts: A Contract Analysis, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
601, 603 (2010) (arguing that IFAs are enforceable under the common law of
contracts and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); Rüdiger
Krause, International Framework Agreements as Instrument for the Legal Enforcement of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining? The German
Case, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 749, 768 (2012) (“[I]t is not out of the question that IFAs can be enforced legally in a German labor court. But there are
many legal hurdles to surmount, and the prospects will depend highly on the
concrete wording of the IFA and on the circumstances of its conclusion.”).
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generally lack the elements of legally binding contracts, such as
18
intent to be legally bound or certainty of terms. Therefore,
IFAs are “soft law” instruments, meaning that the parties enforce them themselves, through collaboration, rather than
19
through judicial means. In industrial relations, such collaboration normally occurs against the backdrop of potential indus20
trial conflict.
IFAs are more than an academic curiosity. The growth of
IFAs has been quite significant since the mid−1990s. The
21
French foods company, Dannon, signed the first IFA in 1988.
Multinational firms and global unions have signed about 110
22
similar agreements since Dannon signed its IFA. Figure 1
shows this growth over time. These agreements cover approximately nine million workers, excluding suppliers and subcon23
tractors.

18. But see Coleman, supra note 17, at 621–24, 630–33 (arguing that IFAs
do not lack intent to be bound or certainty of terms). Moreover, while the consensus is that these agreements are most likely not legally enforceable, some
IFAs may be. The Securitas-UNI Global Union IFA, for example, states:
Securitas and UNI recognise that this Agreement must be applied
within the framework of laws and regulations that apply in each
country and accept that no specific provision of the Agreement is legally enforceable if it violates such laws. However, in the event a provision of this Agreement is invalid in any country, the remainder of
the Agreement that is legally enforceable will remain in full force and
effect.
Global Agreement, Securitas AB-Swed. Transport Workers’ Union-UNI Global
Union, ¶ 8, Oct. 26–Nov. 5, 2012 (on file with author). Therefore, the parties
wanted to craft a legally binding instrument. Moreover, the agreement states:
“[t]his Agreement shall be governed and construed with the laws of Sweden,”
hence providing further evidence that the parties wanted courts to retain some
level of supervisory authority over the instrument. Id. Whether the courts can
issue injunctive relief compelling compliance with the instrument, or damage
awards for breach of the IFA under Swedish law, or merely refrain from declaring the instrument unenforceable because it is illegal or contrary to public
policy is an altogether different issue with no definite answer at this moment.
19. Goldman, supra note 17, at 606.
20. See Lance Compa & Fred Feinstein, Enforcing European Corporate
Commitments to Freedom of Association by Legal and Industrial Action in the
United States: Enforcement by Industrial Action, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
635, 635–37 (2012).
21. Papadakis, supra note 1, at 3.
22. International Framework Agreements, THE DATABASE ON EUROPEAN
WORKS COUNCIL AGREEMENTS, http://www.ewcdb.eu/list_intl_framework_
agreements.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
23. For inference of this estimation, see id.
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Figure 1: IFAs Signed Each Year, 1994–2012
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Multinational companies have signed IFAs because it helps
25
them “manage risk.” It also helps firms undertake restructur26
ings with collaboration from their employees. Unions and
27
works councils in the home country of the signatory parties
24. Adapted from European Trade Union Institute data. See International
Framework Agreements, supra note 22.
25. Papadakis, supra note 1, at 9.
26. Id.
27. Works councils are, generally, employee representation bodies embedded in the corporate governance regime of a firm. Joel Rogers & Wolfgang
Streeck, The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems, in WORKS
COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 3, 6 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995). They are
independent of labor unions. Id. There are two main models of works councils,
the German and French. In Germany, “works councils” generally refers to “institutionalized representation of interests for employees within an establishment.” Works Council: Germany, EUROFOUND (last updated Aug. 14, 2009),
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/GERMANY/WORKSCOUNCIL-DE
.htm. In France it more generally refers to an “[i]nstitution of employee representation.” Works Council: France, EUROFOUND (last updated Aug. 14, 2009),
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/FRANCE/WORKSCOUNCIL-FR.htm
(In the German model only employees are represented. BLANPAIN ET AL., THE
GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 598 (2nd ed. 2012). The “French” model includes both
employee and management representatives. Id. at 661. However, works coun-
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have been fundamental in persuading and compelling multina28
tional firms to sign IFAs. Professor Niklas Egels-Zandén has
perhaps best explained why such national-level actors have
mattered so much for IFAs. He argued that IFAs are part of a
“continuous bargaining model” between employers and employee representatives who have had long and established relation29
ships. IFAs are one of many agreements made in the course of
30
the parties’ relationship. Labor organizations outside the national boundaries of the signatory employers’ home country
simply do not have that preexisting relationship of trust with
31
the signatory employers.
IFAs matter because they can help provide labor, which is
still fettered by national boundaries, a more prominent role in
32
the global economy. As sociologist Jamie McCallum has detailed, IFAs “mark the first instance in the history of the labor
movement that transnational companies have bargained direct33
ly with unions at the global level.” They provide hope to a
dwindling labor movement. As we can see in Figures 2 through
5, union density in the world’s developed capitalist democracies
34
has generally been declining for decades. While very few
cils are all creations of national legislation and will likely differ by country.
Rogers & Streeck, supra at 27.
We must also note that even though works councils and unions are formally independent, unions many times play important roles within works
councils, particularly in Germany. Id. at 11–16. However, sometimes unions
and works councils may be at odds. Id.
28. Michael Fichter & Markus Helfen, Going Local with Global Policies:
Implementing International Framework Agreements in Brazil and the United
States, in SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 85, 86, 91; Isabelle
Schömann, The Impact of Transnational Company Agreements on Social Dialogue and Industrial Relations, in SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, 21,
26–27.
29. Niklas Egels-Zandén, TNC Motives for Signing International Framework Agreements: A Continuous Bargaining Model of Stakeholder Pressure, 84
J. BUS. ETHICS 529, 540–41 (2009).
30. See id. at 543 (referencing various types of agreements adopted by
corporations including “IFAs, codes of conduct, and/or [corporate social responsibility] policies/practices”).
31. See id. (describing the importance of a trusting corporate-union relationship compared to external pressures from non-governmental organizations
in a corporation’s decision to enter an IFA).
32. MCCALLUM, supra note 12, at 37.
33. Id.
34. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see OECD, http://
www.oecd.org (search “trade union density;” follow link to “Trade union densi-
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countries, such as Belgium and some Scandinavian countries,
have not seen significant drops in union density since the
1970s, others such as the U.K., France, Germany, Japan, Aus35
tralia, and the United States have seen dramatic declines. In
fact, private union density in the United States is now at about
36
6.7% and keeps dropping.
Figure 2. Union Density in Lower Density Countries,
1960–2010
37
Percentage of employees
35

30

25

20

15

10

5

France

United States

Spain

ty” to download data) (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
35. Id.
36. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey, UNIONSTATS.COM, http://
www.unionstats.com (follow hyperlink under “U.S. Historical Tables: Union
Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment, 1973–2013: Private Sector”) (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
37. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see http://www
.oecd.org (search “trade union density”; follow link to “Trade union density” to
download data).
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Figure 3. Union Density in Middle Density Countries,
1960–2010
38
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38. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see http://www
.oecd.org (search “trade union density;” follow link to “Trade union density” to
download data).
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Figure 4. Union Density in Middle/Higher Density Countries, 1960–2010
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39. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see http://www
.oecd.org (search “trade union density;” follow link to “Trade union density” to
download data).

2014]

SOFT MEANS AND HARD CHALLENGES

1759

Figure 5. Union Density in Higher Density Countries,
1960–2010
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40. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see http://www
.oecd.org (search “trade union density;” follow link to “Trade union density” to
download data).
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Sociologist Bruce Western concluded that a significant reason for the decline of unions in the developed capitalist democracies is the mismatch between the rise of global business and
markets and the still national character of labor market regu41
latory institutions, i.e., labor law and labor unions. According
to Western, unless the collective labor market actors regulate
labor markets transnationally, union density in the developed,
42
capitalist democracies will continue to decline. From a sociological perspective, labor law seems to have lost its “empirical
validity” in the developed, capitalist democracies, or its ability
43
to shape the real world given the advent of globalization.
Also tied to the need to give global labor an institutional
role in the global economy is the attempt to use IFAs as alter44
natives to unilateral codes of conduct. Today, most multinational companies have adopted corporate codes of conduct
where they make pledges regarding the firms’ social and envi45
ronmental responsibilities. However, these codes are difficult
if not impossible to enforce or effectively use because they are
46
unilaterally drawn by firms. IFAs, being at least bilateral in
nature, are better situated to be implemented and enforced by
47
their signatory parties and stakeholders.
But are IFAs indeed helping to create a new framework for
global industrial relations? Sociologist James McCallum reports that Stephen Lerner, a prominent American labor union
strategist, has argued that IFAs cannot be enforced and, as a
48
result, should be abandoned as a tactical tool. Certainly, IFAs
are hard, if not impossible to enforce legally. However, the no41. WESTERN, supra note 7, at 195–97.
42. Id.
43. See Michel Coutu, With Hugo Sinzheimer and Max Weber in Mind:
The Current Crisis and the Future of Labor Law, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
605, 613, (2013) (citing MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT [ECONOMY AND SOCIETY] 355 (1988)); id. at 622 (“[T]he empirical validity of labor
law has been greatly diminished, in light of its basic incapacity in the context
of globalization.”); see also Charles Tilly, Globalization Threatens Labor’s
Rights, 47 INT’L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. 1 passim (1995) (explaining
that the decline of the national state in contrast to the increasing power and
influence of global business has made labor law—which was national for most
of the Twentieth Century—ineffective).
44. See Drouin, supra note 6, at 591–94.
45. See id. at 591 (describing the “rapid proliferation of private normative
instruments concerning workers’ rights” in transnational corporations).
46. Id. at 592.
47. Id.
48. MCCALLUM, supra note 12, at 44.
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tion that soft law instruments such as IFAs cannot be enforced
at all is not necessarily true. As the words of the South African
49
unionist cited above depict, IFAs can inspire local union activists to organize workers on the ground and bind employers
morally and socially to the instrument. The literature on soft
law has also shown that soft law can harden to bind actors because it helps to develop new norms that people begin to inter50
nalize. It can also serve as an alternative or complement to
51
hard law. Under certain conditions, hard law and soft law can
52
even become antagonists and displace one another. Soft law,
therefore, could be used to re-regulate labor at a global level, be
53
it as an alternative or an antagonist to hard law. Continued
experimentation with and research of IFAs is therefore warranted.
Other critics could argue that IFAs are yet too marginal to
be considered a significant breakthrough for global labor. Even
if IFAs have been increasing at a pace of ten to fifteen a year,
54
covering about nine million workers excluding contractors,
55
and total over 110, these numbers are not extraordinary. As
an ILO-related publication recently reported:
49. See id. at 118.
50. The literature is too vast to adequately cite and discuss here, but see
Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706,
712–21 (2010) (describing the canonical literature of soft and hard law).
51. See id.; see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Puzzling Evidence from a Troubled Time: Rethinking State Promotion of Safe Work During the Bush Administration, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 295, 309 (2010) (explaining that the
National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH), as a soft law agency, was
able to effectively promote workplace safety during the Bush administration
while the targeted Office of Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) could
not).
52. See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 50, at 788–99 (noting instances
where the laws counter one another).
53. In a prior work, the author has argued that transnational movement
mobilization, in the form of solidarity strikes, boycotts, and similar actions, is
needed to help enforce IFAs. Rosado Marzán, supra note 3, at 25. Others have
followed a similar line of research and argument. See, e.g., Compa & Feinstein,
supra note 20, at 643–54 (investigating how industrial action can be used to
enforce commitments); Dimitris Stevis & Michael Fichter, International
Framework Agreements in the United States: Escaping, Projecting, or Globalizing Social Dialogues?, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 667, 686 (2012) (noting a
sector’s effective invocation of IFA obligations as part of its campaign).
54. Rosado Marzán, supra note 3, at 25.
55. See International Framework Agreements, supra note 22; see also
Framework Agreements, GLOBAL UNIONS, http://www.global-unions.org/
framework-agreements.html.
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[W]e are still looking at a somewhat marginal phenomenon– the average lies between 10 and 15 agreements per year in a universe of
about 80,000 multinationals worldwide. It is an activity that focuses
very much on companies that have major importance to trade unions,
56
in key sectors such as metalworking and telecommunications.

When one considers that there are 80,000 multinational firms
in the world and only around 110 have signed IFAs, the instruments seem trivial. Coupled with the fact that the instruments are clustered in European firms, the IFAs seem like
57
some sort of exotic European curiosity.
There is a long way to go before IFAs can become effective
instruments for global labor. Nevertheless, some case studies
show that some IFAs have helped national unions to effectively
58
pressure employers to meet union demands. The little that we
know about IFAs at least suggests that we need to learn more
about their impact on the ground to better comprehend their
effectiveness.
Moreover, the coverage of IFAs is potentially much larger
than that of the 110 firms that have currently signed the
agreements. As of 2008, we know that about thirteen IFAs have
59
mandatory terms covering suppliers. We do not know how
many suppliers this amounts to and how many more workers
are therefore covered by the terms of the IFAs, but the numbers could be quite substantial. Therefore, the 110 IFAs represent more than their nominal value.
Finally, we should not undervalue the role that iconic firms
and industry leaders that have signed IFAs can have on the
60
rest of the global economy. Industry leaders can help to ratch61
et up standards through best practices. If movement actors
such as global unions can help to publicize those best practices
developed through IFAs, other firms may adopt IFAs or at least
internalize many of the values inherent in these instruments.

56. INT’L TRAINING CTR. OF THE INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 17, at 23.
57. Rosado Marzán, supra note 3, at 26 (detailing how most IFAs have
been signed by companies based in Europe).
58. See Compa & Feinstein, supra note 20 (describing three cases of industrial action); Fichter & Helfen, supra note 28, at 103–10 (discussing six examples of positive IFA effects); Stevis & Fichter, supra note 53, at 689–90
(noting how “concerted union action has delivered results” in certain instances).
59. SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 259–68.
60. ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? 4–5
(2001).
61. Id.
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To summarize, IFAs have been growing in number since
the 1990s. They are soft law instruments. They could be hardened and enforced by the parties. More IFAs need to be signed
before they can become effective global labor market regulatory
instruments. However, the ones that we have may help to promote best practices that may catch on at a global level and help
to diffuse IFAs. Whether or not they can be hardened, enforced
and diffused are empirical questions that require further experimentation and research to be answered. Therefore, this Article
reports original empirical research on existing IFAs to enrich
our knowledge of IFAs. The next section details the methodology used to learn more about these instruments.
II. METHODOLOGY
The author performed original field research for six months
in Europe to study IFAs. He did the research from June 2012
through November of 2012. The research was “exploratory,”
meaning that it could not provide definitive answers to particular questions; rather, it helped the author better understand
62
IFAs, a relatively obscure subject of scholarly inquiry.
In this Article, the author reported on two industry groups,
the global German auto industry and the global temporary service agencies (“temp agencies”). The author chose these industries because they represent industries with different industrial
relations trajectories, hence providing significant case variance
to learn more about IFAs. Auto is a traditionally unionized in63
dustry where strong unions have dominated. Temp agency
workers, on the contrary, work casually and in time-limited
64
contracts, if not precariously. They are seldom unionized.
62. ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGNS AND METHODS 6 (3d
ed. 2003) (describing exploratory study as one that attempts “to develop pertinent hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry”).
63. See BEVERLY SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS’ MOVEMENTS AND
GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870 41–43 (2003) (noting the “Fordist” organization of
production in the auto industry has lent support to strong labor movements
and that as the industry moves from region to region—from the United States,
to Western Europe and Japan, to Brazil, to South Africa, and to South Korea—so do the autoworker unions and labor conflicts).
64. Unionization of temp agency workers is generally very low, but national variations exist. Temporary Agency Work and Collective Bargaining in
the EU, EUROFOUND 17–19 (2009), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/
eiro/tn0807019s/tn0807019s.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). According to the
author’s sources, U.S. employees of temp agencies lack union representation.
Telephone Interview with Pam Berklich, Senior Vice President, OCG-Centers
of Excellence at Kelly Services (Oct. 8, 2012); Telephone Interview with Göran
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Traditionally unionized industries such as auto have a greater
likelihood of maintaining collective bargaining relations than
non-traditionally unionized industries, such as the temp agency
65
sector. Therefore, we should be able to learn different things
from IFAs negotiated in traditional unionized industries and in
those that are not. This said, and to reiterate, the cases were
not chosen to test a specific hypothesis but, rather, to help the
author learn about IFAs in an exploratory fashion.
The author studied the German auto firms Volkswagen
and Daimler, the American staffing firms Manpower and Kelly
Services, the Swiss staffing firm Adecco and the International
Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (hereinafter referred to as “Ciett”, its acronym in French), the association rep66
resenting the staffing firms. The author also interviewed representatives of the German union IG Metall, which represents
autoworkers; the global union IndustriALL, which also represents autoworkers; and UNI Global Union, which represents
temp agency workers. The author also interviewed representatives of the work councils of Volkswagen and Daimler involved
67
in implementing the IFAs.

Hultin, Government Affairs Advisor, Manpower, Inc. (July 19, 2012). According to UNI Global Union, which represents temp agency workers at a global
level, a very small fraction of those workers may be unionized in the firms
where the national members of the global union operate. Telephone Interview
with Giedre Lelyte, Director, UNI Gaming & UNI Temp Agency Work, UNI
Global Union (July 31, 2012). Indeed, temp agency work poses significant challenges to union organization. Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, European Trade
Unions and ‘Atypical’ Workers, 42 INDUS. REL. J. 293, 297–99 (2011).
65. See Joelle Sano & John B. Williamson, Factors Affecting Union Decline in 18 OECD Countries and Their Implications for Labor Movement Reform, 49 INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 479, 479 (2008) (noting how “traditional union
density” helps explain trends and cross-national variances in union membership in the OECD region).
66. The type of interviewing the author used is referred to, in the social
sciences, as “elite” interviewing. Elite interviewees are those who are particularly knowledgeable about a subject and its context. BILL GILLHAM, RESEARCH
INTERVIEWING: THE RANGE OF TECHNIQUES 54 (photo. reprint 2010) (2005).
67. The author did most of the interviews for the auto industry in Germany in person. The author digitally recorded all the interviews conducted in
person. Because of time and cost concerns, the author did not transcribe any of
the interviews but rather took notes during the interviews. On the day of the
interview or a few days thereafter, the author used a word processor to put his
notes into a more readable, accessible, and searchable format. The author also
used the interview recordings to transfer his notes into a word processor. Furthermore, because of practical and economic reasons, some informants of the
auto industry had to answer interview questions by e-mail.
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III. RESULTS
After analyzing the IFAs signed by Daimler, Volkswagen,
and Ciett, and interviewing representatives of the signers, it
was evident that the parties maintain differences over the
meaning of their IFAs that can stall the IFAs and the development of a global labor relations system. Some hardening of the
IFAs seems necessary.
A. THE AUTO IFAS OF DAIMLER AND VOLKSWAGEN

68

The Daimler and Volkswagen IFAs have been used by
global and national level unions to resolve a myriad of issues
confronted by the firms, from restructurings to safeguarding
69
freedom of association. However, the particular rights that
In-person interviews are costly, especially when they require international travel, but provide the researcher with more information as the interviewer
can read body language and other non-verbal forms of communications. See id.
Telephone interviews are cheaper, since they do not require travel, but
the interviewer may lose some information provided by non-verbal communicative cues. Because of this, the telephone interviewer must remain more vigilant and alert of what is being said in an interview than an in-person interviewer. Similarly, telephone interviews are usually shorter in duration than
face-to-face interviews because of the additional effort required to maintain
meaningful communication. Id. at 103–06.
E-mail interviews, like telephone interviews, are economical and provide
instant access worldwide. Respondents can also answer the e-mail at their
convenience. On the other hand, some elements of face-to-face communication
are lost, as in the telephone interview. Responses can at times be too informal
or abbreviated for research purposes, which forces the researcher to set a tone
of formality for the e-mail exchange. Id. at 105–12.
For similar reasons of time and economy, the author interviewed the temp
agencies’ and UNI Global Union representatives by telephone. The author did
not record any of the telephone interviews. Rather, the author took copious
notes during the interviews and on the same day, or shortly thereafter, used a
word processor to transfer his notes into a more readable, accessible, and
searchable format. For more information regarding the persons interviewed
for this study, see infra Appendix.
68. The author reported most of the information contained in this section
regarding the German auto IFAs in a prior article. See Rosado Marzán, supra
note 3.
69. Interview with Frank Patta, General Secretary of Group Works Council, Volkswagen Group, in Wolfsburg, Ger. (Sept. 21, 2012) (freedom of association); Interview with Claudia Rahman, International Department, IG Metall,
in Frankfurt, Ger. (Sept. 3, 2012) (employer restructuring). See generally
Dimitris Stevis, The Impacts of International Framework Agreements: Lessons
from the Daimler Case, in SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra
note 1, at 116–42; Isabel da Costa & Udo Rehfeldt, Transnational Restructuring Agreements: General Overview and Specific Evidence from the European
Automobile Sector, in SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 1,
at 143–63.
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the IFA provides to national level unions remain vague. The
vagueness may lead to interpretations inapposite to those
sought by the national actors that seek to use the IFA in concrete situations. Conflicts can thus ensue between national actors, e.g., German and U.S. union officers.
German subjects the author interviewed for this project
told the author that U.S. union officers sought to have Daimler
70
provide them with “card check” recognition under the IFA.
However, Daimler and the German unions and works councils
rejected the American United Auto Workers’ (UAW) interpretation of freedom-of-association principles and what “neutrality”
71
means under the IFA. The firm and German labor officials
and employee representatives argue that the IFA promotes
employer neutrality but not card check recognition for workers
72
in the United States This means that unions will need to win
union elections if they want to represent employees of German
auto transplant in the United States that have signed IFAs.
This difference between U.S. and German unions and employee
73
representatives marks a rift in global labor.
1. The Parties
Daimler is one of the world’s leading producers of cars,
74
vans, trucks, and buses. The company traces its history to
1886 when Gottlieb Daimler and Carl Benz invented the auto-

70. The parties interviewed could not say whether Volkswagen was asked
to provide card check recognition. However, the interviews suggest that
Volkswagen has not provided such recognition, since German industrial relations experts all agreed that the agreement did not provide for card check
recognition. Interview with Helmut Lense, Director of Automotive and Rubber, IndustriALL Global Union, in Geneva, Switz. (July 11, 2012); Interview
with Frank Patta, supra note 69; Interview with Claudia Rahman, supra note
69; Interview with Robert Steiert, Retired IMF and IG Metall Union Officer, in
Zurich, Switz. (July 10, 2012).
71. Interview with Robert Steiert, supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. The author must reiterate that because the UAW failed to respond to
numerous invitations for participation in this study, the author is not certain
of the union’s view as to the German firms’ refusal to grant card check recognition through the IFA. However, previous press reports confirm that recognition of card checks was a “top goal[]” of the UAW in contracting in the past.
See Danny Hakim, Union Organizing Remains Muddled in Chrysler Pact, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/07/business/07AUTO
.html.
74. Company, DAIMLER, http://www.daimler.com/company (last visited
Mar. 25, 2014).
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75

mobile. Headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, it has manufacturing operations in seventeen countries, including the
United States, where it has numerous manufacturing facilities,
76
most of which make trucks and vans. In 2012, Daimler pro77
duced 2.2 million vehicles. Its automobile plant in the United
78
States is located in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. In 2012 that plant
employed almost 3000 employees and produced over 180,000
79
vehicles. It is also one of the very few Daimler plants in the
80
world where the employees lack union representation.
81
Volkswagen is the largest automaker in Europe. In 2012,
Volkswagen delivered to its global customers more than 9.2
million vehicles, which is about twelve percent of the global
82
passenger car market. Its headquarters are located in Wolfs83
burg, Germany. The company has almost one hundred manufacturing locations in twenty-seven countries, including one in
Chattanooga, Tennessee, where the company builds the Passat
84
model. The Chattanooga plant has been in operation since
85
2011. As is the case at the Daimler plant in Tuscaloosa,
Volkswagen workers at Chattanooga are not represented by a
86
union.
75. Id.
76. Locations in North and Central America, DAIMLER, http://www
.daimler.com/company/daimler-worldwide (click map over North and Central
America) (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
77. Company, supra note 74.
78. Locations in North and Central America, supra note 76 (follow “Tuscaloosa, Mercedes-Benz Plant” hyperlink).
79. Id. (follow “facts and figures” hyperlink).
80. Stevis, supra note 69, at 133.
81. The Group, VOLKSWAGEN, http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/
vwcorp/content/en/the_group.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Production Plants, VOLKSWAGEN, http://www.volkswagenag.com/
content/vwcorp/content/en/the_group/production_plants.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2014).
85. Id.
86. On September 6, 2013, the New York Times reported that the UAW
and Volkswagen were discussing ways to establish a union and a Germanstyle works council at the firm. Steven Greenhouse, VW and Its Workers Explore a Union at a Tennessee Plant, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/09/07/business/vw-and-auto-workers-explore-union-at
-tennessee-plant.html; see also Erik Schelzig & Tom Krisheruaw, Majority at
VW Plant Have Signed Union Cards, CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, http://
www.suntimes.com/business/22505211-420/uaw-majority-at-vw-plant-have
-signed-union-cards.html. The author attempted to get details on the subject,
but the management of Volkswagen could speak no further on the matter. E-
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Like most large German firms, the corporate structure of
Daimler and Volkswagen include a supervisory board and a
87
managerial board. Employee representative comprise half of
the supervisory board while stockowner representatives com88
pose the other half. Under German law, the supervisory board
89
appoints and supervises the managerial board of the firm.
Employee representation in the firm’s management accounts
90
for German “co-determination.”
IndustriALL Global Union is a global union based in Geneva, Switzerland. IndustriALL claims that it represents fifty
91
million workers in 140 countries. Its constituent unions represent workers in the mining, energy and manufacturing sec92
tors. The global union was founded in 2012 when three formerly separate global unions, the International Metalworkers
Federation (IMF), the International Federation of Chemical,
Energy, Mine, and General Workers’ Unions, and International
93
Textiles Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation, merged.
Daimler entered into the IFA with the so-called “Daimler
World Employee Committee,” referred to here as the “Daimler
94
World Works Council,” in September 2002. According to the
mail from Wolfgang Fueter, Director of Human Resources, Volkswagen Financial Services AG, to Author (Sept. 10, 2013 4:30AM) (on file with author). The
UAW did not answer the author’s requests to speak about the matter. On February 14, 2014, the UAW lost the union election in Volkswagen, with 712 votes
against the union and 626 in favor of the union, despite management’s neutrality during the union elections. Steven Greenhouse, Volkswagen Vote Is Defeat for Labor in South, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/02/15/business/volkswagen-workers-reject-forming-a-union.html?hpw&
rref=business&_r=0. As this article goes to press, the UAW has requested that
the NLRB set aside the election results because government officials and private outside groups interfered with employees’ rights to organize. Dave Flessner, UAW appeals to keep ‘outside groups’ out of decision on new union vote at
VW plant, TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 12, 2104, http://timesfreepress.com/news/
2014/mar/12/uaw-appeals-nlrb-board-keep-outside-groups-out-dec/.
87. Senior Management, VOLKSWAGEN, http://www.volkswagenag.com/
content/vwcorp/content/en/the_group/senior_management.html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2014). For the law on employee participation in the supervisory
boards of German firms see MANFRED WEISS & MARLENE SCHMIDT, LABOUR
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY § 630, at 249 (4th ed. 2008).
88. WEISS & SCHMIDT, supra note 87, § 630, at 249.
89. Id. § 647, at 254.
90. BLANPAIN, supra note 27, at 603.
91. About Us, INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL UNION, http://www.Industriall-union
.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Social Responsibility Principles of DaimlerChrysler, Daim-
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instrument, the Daimler World Works Council signed the IFA
“on behalf of the International Metalworkers Federation
95
(IMF).” Volkswagen signed its IFA in 2002. Like the Daimler
IFA, the Volkswagen IFA was also entered between the IMF,
today IndustriALL, and the Group Global Works Council of
Volkswagen (hereinafter referred to as the “Volkswagen Global
Works Council”). As in the Daimler IFA, the Global Works
96
Council played the pivotal role.
The role of the Global Works Councils in the German auto
IFAs was fundamental. These employer representation bodies
seem to have brokered the agreements between global management and the global unions. Given that the employee representation bodies, the works councils, are governance structures
of the firms—are part of the firm—German auto IFAs show
that the management of these firms may be willing only to enter into a global agreement with a party that it highly trusts,
e.g., its own employee representation body. The global unions
remained mostly nominal parties to the agreements. In this
manner, German auto IFAs fit the “continuous bargaining
model” explained by Professor Egels-Zandén and prior research
that has noted the importance of pre-existing relations of trust
for IFAs.
2. What the IFAs Regulate
The Daimler IFA is officially called the “Social Responsibil97
ity Principles of Daimler[].” The parties pledge to condemn
lerChrysler AG, 4 (Sept. 2002), http://www.industriall-union.org/sites/default/
files/uploads/documents/GFAs/Daimler/daimler-gfa-english.pdf [hereinafter
Daimler IFA]. Please also note that an identical version of the agreement essentially corroborating the IFAs original language, but now only on behalf of
Daimler, was more recently signed in February 2012 with the World Employee
Committee on behalf of IMF. See generally Standards, Principles, and Guidelines, DAIMLER, http://reports2.equitystory.com/cgi-bin/show.ssp?
companyName=daimler&language=English&report_id=nb-2008&id=603510&
quickSearch=LA9 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). This Article only analyzes the
September 2002 agreement because the 2012 agreement is too recent to evaluate its impact. Nevertheless, the article refers to the DaimlerChrysler 2002
agreement as the “Daimler IFA” because Daimler and Chrysler are no longer a
merged company.
95. Id. The author could not verify the exact reasons why the Daimler
Global Works Council signed the IFA “on behalf of the IMF” and why the IMF
did not sign the instrument directly as a party. The legal meaning of such a
signature is also hard to resolve.
96. See Stevis, supra note 69, at 122–23 (“A second important element of
German industrial relations is that of works councils . . . .”).
97. See Daimler IFA, supra note 94.
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child and slave labor and promote equal opportunity and equal
98
pay for equal work. They also agreed that they would support
employees’ rights to form unions, establish constructive relationships with the employees, and “involve and inform” em99
ployees as much as possible. The parties condemned all ex100
ploitative employment relations. They pledged to protect the
101
health and safety of the company’s employees.
They also
pledged to provide “reasonable compensation of a level no less
than the legally established minimum-wage and the local job
market,” and abide by national laws regarding working time
and provide training to its employees to facilitate “good perfor102
mance and high quality work.” The parties called on and encouraged Daimler’s suppliers to establish similar principles if
103
they are to maintain a relationship with the firm. Finally, the
parties pledged to establish a system of implementation in
which management, labor, and auditors would work together to
104
implement the instrument in the workplace.
The Volkswagen IFA is somewhat shorter than Daimler’s
and is written in more general terms. It calls itself the “Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial Relationships at
105
Volkswagen.” Generally, the IFA mentions “the Conventions
of the International Labour Organisation” as “rights and prin106
ciples” taken “into consideration” by the instrument. As all
IFAs, the IFA also pledges to abide by the ILO’s core conven107
tions. In addition to pledging to respect the ILO’s core labor

98. Id. at 1.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial Relationships at
Volkswagen, Volkswagen AG (June 6, 2002), http://www.Industriall-union.org/
sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GFAs/Volkswagen/vweng.pdf [hereinafter Volkswagen IFA].
106. See id. pmbl.
107. The ILOs’ core conventions, which map onto Volkswagen’s “Basic
Goals” in the IFA are, without exception: 29 Forced Labour Convention, 1930;
87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention,
1949; 98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949; 100
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951; 105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957; 111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention,
1958; 138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973; 182 Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention, 1999. See Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, http://www.ilo
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standards, the IFA also states that the firm will provide compensation, working hours and health and safety standards that
108
at least meet national legal criteria. Finally, the agreement
has a “realisation” clause that calls for the signers to imple109
ment and enforce the agreement. It also encourages suppliers
110
to follow similar principles.
3. No Card Checks for American Workers
Even though the parties signed agreements respecting the
right of freedom of association, there does not seem to be consensus on what that clause means for U.S. workers. According
to a former German officer of the IMF and IG Metall, one of the
author’s sources, while UAW believes, or at least at some point
assumed, that the parties agreed on “card check recognition” in
the United States, the German firms, works councils, and un111
ions disagreed. For the German parties, freedom of association only entails that the employer does not proactively oppose
the union in the workplace. The employer need not facilitate
112
unionization through voluntary recognition or other means.
German and American unionists are therefore at odds over the
importance of the so-called “card check” and its importance for
113
freedom of association.
Daimler’s IFA has explicit language regarding freedom of
association and effective collective bargaining. The freedom of
association language in the instrument ostensibly is strongly
favorable to collective representation rights. It states:
Daimler[] acknowledges the human right to form trade unions.
During organization campaigns the company and the executives will
remain neutral; the trade unions and the company will comply with
basic democratic principles, and thus, they will ensure [that] the employees can make a free decision. Daimler[] respects the right to collective bargaining.
.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/
conventions-and-recommendations (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
108. See Volkswagen IFA, supra note 105, §§ 1.5–1.7.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Interview with Robert Steiert, supra note 70. The author attempted to
get a response from the UAW about this matter but the union did not answer
any of the author’s requests.
112. Id.
113. Note, however, that the UAW did not respond to the author’s request
to participate in this study. The evidence presented here regarding the card
check comes from interviews with German industrial relations representatives
and secondary literature.
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Elaboration of this human right is subject to national statutory regulations and existing agreements. Freedom of association will be granted even in those countries in which freedom of association is not pro114
tected by law.

Management pledged to follow the ILO’s core labor stand115
ards. The company would even go beyond national laws, if
116
necessary, to live up to freedom-of-association principles.
The Volkswagen IFA’s “Freedom of Association” clause is
somewhat similar to that of Daimler, but not exactly the same.
It states, perhaps more generally than the Daimler IFA, that:
The basic right of all employees to establish and join unions and employee representations is acknowledged. Volkswagen, the unions and
employee representatives respectively work together openly and in
117
the spirit of constructive and co-operative conflict management.

The clause supports a basic right to organize and of employees
118
to be represented, and to maintain cooperative relations.
The policy of both German auto manufacturers regarding
union recognition seems to be that they will remain “neutral”
during the organizing drive. German automakers still want a
formal vote by the workers to demonstrate their support of the
union. These two German automakers do not seem to favor
voluntary recognition and card checks for U.S. workers even
though U.S. unions today favor card checks over traditional
119
NLRB elections. U.S. unions and many pro-union lawyers
and scholars prefer the card check because traditional union
elections let employers run an anti-union campaign, which unions allege will coerce and intimidate employees to vote against
120
the union. Even though, under U.S. federal labor laws, em114. Daimler IFA, supra note 94, at 2 (emphasis added).
115. See id. at 1 (describing their implemented policies as the policies “that
are oriented at the conventions of the International Labour Organization”).
116. This is evidenced by Daimler’s promise that “[f]reedom of association
will be granted even in those countries in which freedom of association is not
protected by law.” Id. at 2.
117. Volkswagen IFA, supra note 105, § 1.1.
118. See id.
119. See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 822 (2005)
(noting that “[n]eutrality agreements combined with card checks” has now
“become the principal strategy pursued by many labor organizations”).
120. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation
Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 516–23 (1993) (noting
employers and workers are locked in unequal bargaining relationships and the
union election model of the NLRA has fostered a wrong impression that unions and employers square off as equals in election campaigns, just as political
parties in government elections); Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law
Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil
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ployers must campaign in a way that expresses a mere “opinion” that does not amount to an illegal “threat of reprisal or
121
force or promise of benefit,” employers can express their opinions in many settings, such as “captive audience meetings” that
employees have no choice but to attend and hear the employer’s
122
message. Employers need not provide “equal time” to the un123
ion or give it access to company property. Employees normally must attend the captive audience meetings at the risk of being fired. They may have no right to speak at the meeting and
124
express their own views there.
Critics of the NLRB election process also have pointed out
that the law provides weak remedies against law-breaking em125
ployers.
In theory, workers can obtain reinstatement and
back pay, minus mitigation (wages earned at other jobs during
Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 372 (2001)
(“[N]eutrality agreements can redress four disadvantages unions confront
when organizing: employer intimidation, harmful delay, inadequate access to
employees, and inability to secure a first contract.”).
121. National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158c (2012); see also
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (“Thus, an employer is
free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism
or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’ He
may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization
will have on his company. In such a case, however, the prediction must be
carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s belief
as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to convey a
management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of unionization.”).
122. See Elizabeth J. Masson, Note, “Captive Audience” Meetings in Union
Organizing Campaigns: Free Speech or Unfair Advantage?, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
169, 171 (2004) (describing worker attendance as “mandatory” and explaining
that “workers can be fired for refusing to attend”).
123. The Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Taft-Hartley Act does not command that labor organizations as
a matter of abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the
use of every possible means of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that they are entitled to use a medium of communication
simply because the employer is using it.
NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958).
124. See Masson, supra note 122, at 171–72 (2004) (“Workers can . . . be
prohibited from asking questions or speaking during the meeting, upon pain
and discipline, including discharge.”).
125. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to SelfOrganization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1773–74 (1983) (“The
existing representation system under the NLRA provides employers with the
opportunity to coerce employees in their choice about unionization, and the
remedies administered by the National Labor Relations Board . . . cannot—
stem the resulting tide of abuses.”).
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the period the employee did not work for the employer, as a re126
sult of an unfair dismissal). According to some scholars, such
remedies are ineffective because employers sometimes delay reinstatement of workers for as long as three years through ap127
peals and other tactics. Even when employees are reinstated,
they usually leave the job within two years as a result of vin128
dictive treatment by the employer. Some labor law scholars
agree that, given the high costs of a union contract and the low
costs of breaking the labor law, many employers simply inter129
nalize breaking the labor law as a cost of doing business.
American labor law is thus too permissive of employer misconduct and fails to provide adequate means to police the slim protections that it does afford to workers.
Because many unions view current labor law as an ineffective instrument to protect workers’ rights to join unions and
bargain collectively, they have sought alternative routes to union certification. The main alternative route has been voluntary
recognition and card checks, or labor-management agreements
in which the employer pledges to recognize the union if the union can show it has support from a majority of the workers
130
without necessarily going through a formal union vote. Under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), unions can represent
workers for collective bargaining only if the union has obtained
“majority support”—fifty percent plus one—from the workers it
seeks to represent. Once the union obtains majority support, it
retains the right to represent the workers as their “exclusive
131
representative.” Such support can be expressed through card

126. See id. at 1787–93 (discussing the remedies available to employees
under the NLRA and assessing their functionality).
127. See Weiler, supra note 125, at 1795 (explaining that enforcement orders in unfair labor practice proceedings can be forestalled “nearly 1000
days”).
128. See id. at 1792 (noting that eighty percent of employees who accepted
reinstatement “were gone within a year or two” blaming their departure on
“vindictive treatment”).
129. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1537 (2002) (arguing that the remedies of reinstatement and back pay after mitigation “may be seen as a minor cost of doing
business by an employer committed to avoiding unionization”).
130. See Brudney, supra note 119, at 822 (referring to neutrality agreements and card checks as “the principal strategy pursued by many labor organizations”).
131. Under U.S. Federal labor law, recognized unions are “exclusive representatives”—meaning that they have a monopoly over representation rights.
As the NLRA states:
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132

checks —when more than half of the workers sign union authorization cards—or through a union election, administered by
133
the NLRB. However, employers need not recognize the union
through “card checks.” Card check recognition is legal but vol134
untary.
German automakers—and the German unions and employee representatives interviewed—did not agree with American unions on the desirability of “card checks.” A retired officer
of IMF and the German metalworkers union that bargained the
Volkswagen IFA, IG Metall, told the author that, in his opinion, the IFA does not include voluntary recognition and card
checks even though it contains a pledge in favor of freedom of
135
association.
The former German union officer’s comments
were not just stray remarks. A current officer of IndustriALL
136
told the author that IFAs “secure the job of workers.” The
employers pledge not to retaliate against union activists for en137
gaging in union activity.
Such pledges matter because in
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159a (2012) (emphasis added).
Professor Charles Morris has argued, however, that the idea that only exclusive representatives certified by the NLRB have the legal right to compel
employers to bargain is merely “conventional wisdom” as minority unions, absent an exclusive representative, have the same rights to bargain with an employer to the extent they bargain only for the union members. See CHARLES J.
MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 85–88 (2005) (explaining how the notion that only certified or recognized exclusive representative unions have a right to bargain
with an employer is merely a conventional wisdom that is inapposite to the
NLRA and its history); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing minority unions in
the context of IFAs and the International Labour Organization).
132. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. 72, 2 (2011) (“Congress has expressly recognized the legality of employers” voluntary recognition of their employees’ freely chosen representative, as well as the place of such voluntary recognition in the statutory system of workplace representation.”).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
134. See Brudney, supra note 119, at 824 (“The employer may lawfully accede to this request (provided there is in fact uncoerced majority support for
the union).”).
135. Interview with Robert Steiert, supra note 70; see also Volkswagen
IFA, supra note 105, § 1.1.
136. Interview with Helmut Lense, supra note 70.
137. See, e.g., Daimler IFA, supra note 94, at 2 (promising non-interference
of management in labor organization efforts and recognizing the right to free
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some countries, such as the United States, employers often fire
138
union activists. According to the IndustriALL officer, the IFA
prohibits “obvious” and “clear” violations of freedom-ofassociation principles, such as dismissing a worker because of
139
his or her union activities. It does not, however, necessarily
140
support voluntary recognition and card checks.
A similar viewpoint was expressed by an officer of the powerful German union IG Metall, which represents millions of
141
metallurgical workers in Germany, including autoworkers.
She told the author that the IFAs’ language clearly bans intim142
idation and union busting tactics. However, as she told me,
the IFA’s freedom of association clause “does not . . . automatically recognize the union” if workers bring the signed union
143
cards to the firm.
A member of the Volkswagen Global Works Council opined
to the author that the IFA clearly established “positive neutrality,” meaning that Volkswagen would not engage in anti-union
144
tactics. Therefore, the company should not try to engage in
145
union avoidance techniques. Workers should feel at liberty to
146
speak about the union without fearing retaliation. However,
the IFA did not necessarily imply that management would fa147
cilitate unionization by providing voluntary recognition.
association); Volkswagen IFA, supra note 105, § 1.1 (acknowledging the basic
right of all employees to organize).
138. For recent examples of such occurrences, see, e.g., Davie Jamieson,
Walmart Striker Fired 6 Months After Solo Walkout in Florida, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 30, 2013, 7:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/30/
walmart-walkout-florida_n_3354689.html and Michael Levenson, At Rally,
Walsh Urged to Support Fired School Bus Drivers, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2014,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/02/02/union-rally-mayor-walsh-urged
-support-fired-school-bus-drivers/QijNlz8rTcg8sH338woreM/story.html.
139. Interview with Helmut Lense, supra note 70.
140. Id.
141. Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall), EUR. METALWORKERS’
FED’N, http://www.emf-fem.org/Affiliates/Germany/IG-Metall (last visited Mar.
25, 2014).
142. Interview with Claudia Rahman, supra note 69.
143. Id.
144. Interview with Frank Patta, supra note 69.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. The works council member acknowledged that he personally believed
that the union should be organized in simplest possible pathway—e.g., voluntary recognition through card checks. See id. However, he thought that the
agreement did not necessarily provide for voluntary recognition and card
checks. See id.
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In sum, German unionists and the Volkswagen Global
Works Council member do not think the IFA includes language
that necessarily provides voluntary recognition and card checks
for American workers. Rather, they think the IFAs provide
language that stops the employers from proactively (“positively”) engaging in union opposition, as is frequently done by employers in the United States
My exploratory research suggests that, at a global level,
the union movement does not share consensus as to what freedom of association should entail for U.S. workers, e.g., card
checks or union elections where employers remain “neutral.”
With such lack of consensus, U.S. unions have a difficult task
to legitimately call for card checks based on basic freedom of
association rights developed by international norms. Meanwhile, some skeptics may argue that German workers could
gain from weak unions and lower wages in the United States
and elsewhere, as lower wages abroad enable German firms to
get richer and be more able to increase wages and other bene148
fits for their German workers. As German firms become more
transnational, to the point where the sales revenues of German
subsidiaries outside of Germany outpace the total value of
Germany’s exports, the German political economy and its laborfriendly corporate models may depend on disparate labor costs
149
and conditions at home and abroad. These disparities open
Evidence of the German automakers’ position can be traced back to 1999,
when the Wall Street Journal reported that the UAW’s President at the time,
Stephen Yokich, was surprised by Daimler’s refusal to voluntarily recognize
the union in Tuscaloosa through card checks even though the company had
stated that it would not oppose the union. Jeffrey Ball, UAW’s Reception in Alabama Mercedes Plant Is Sour, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2000, at A15. The UAW’s
President sat on the very influential Supervisory Board of the firm, half of
whom were employee representatives. Id.; see also Supervisory Board of Daimler AG, DAIMLER AG, http://www.daimler.com/supervisoryboard (referencing
the German legal requirement that half of Board members be representatives
of employees). Yokich raised complaints there, but to no avail. See, e.g., Lindsay Chappell, Mercedes Union Bid Attacked on Two Fronts, AUTO. NEWS (Aug.
17, 2006, 12:01 AM) http://www.autonews.com/article/20060417/SUB/
60413029 (referencing the eventual failure of Yokich’s efforts in 2000).
148. For example, research has shown a positive correlation between outsourcing and domestic plant productivity in the German manufacturing sector,
buttressing some suspicions that currently employed German industrial workers may benefit from outsourcing if increased productivity at home aided by
outsourcing translates into higher pay at home. See Craig Aubuchon et al.,
The Extant and Impact of Outsourcing: Evidence from Germany, 94 FED. RES.
BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 287 (2012).
149. See, e.g., Bertrand Benoit & Richard Milne, Germany’s Best-Kept Secret: How Its Exporters Are Beating the World, FIN. TIMES, May 16, 2006,
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possibilities for opportunism, or at least suspicions of it, and
bode ill for the fledgling global labor movement.
B. THE TEMP AGENCY IFA
A global representative of temp agencies, Ciett, many of its
global corporate members, and UNI Global Union signed the
150
temp agency IFA. The temp agency IFA establishes pledges
151
to live by the ILO core labor rights, ILO Convention 181 and
152
ILO Recommendation 188 on temp agency work, which attempt to provide a regulatory environment for legitimate and
153
socially beneficial temp agency work. Importantly, it got a
pledge from Ciett to not provide employees who may be used as
154
strike breakers by user firms. However, after signing the
IFA, UNI Global Union signed a document with all other global
unions titled “Global Union Principles on Temporary Work
Agencies” where temp agency work was strongly criticized by
155
156
the global unions. Ciett disagreed with the criticism, lead157
ing its relation with UNI to sour and the IFA to lose potency.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/54730f00-e6d4-11da-a36e-0000779e2340.html#
axzz2cYSxqgv0.
150. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Ciett Corporate Members & UNI Global Union on Temporary Agency Work (Oct. 24, 2008), http://
www2.asetuc.org/media/04c%20%28ENG%29%20MOU%20CIETTE%20UNI
.pdf [hereinafter Temp Agency IFA].
151. Convention (No. 181) Concerning Private Employment Agencies, June
19, 1997, 2115 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter ILO Convention 181].
152. Int’l Labour Org., Recommendation Concerning Private Employment
Agencies (June 19, 1997), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0:
:NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312526 (establishing detailed rules for
temporary employment agencies, including but not limited to rules pertaining
to non-discrimination, privacy, and bans against provision of strikebreakers).
153. See Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 3.
154. Id.
155. Statement, Council of Global Unions, Global Union Principles on
Temporary Work Agencies (Jan. 23–24, 2012), http://www.global-unions
.org/spip.php?action=acceder_document&arg=471&cle=9c244964753f3de9a973
72156a49fb567f009f34&file=pdf%2Fgu_temp_work_agencies_principles.pdf.
156. See Ciett Reacts to Global Unions’ Principles on TAW: “TAW Is the
Most Secure Form of External Flexible Employment”, CIETT, http://www
.ciett.org/index.php?id=110&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=118&tx_ttnews[backPid]=1&
cHash=0e274d2c9c (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
157. For a contemporaneous reaction from Ciett, see Meeting with Philip
Jennings—UNI Global, CIETT & EUROCIETT PUB. AFF. 2 (Apr. 2012), http://
www.rcsa.com.au/documents/other_docos/Ciett%20Public%20Affairs%
20Report%20-%20April%202012.pdf.
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1. The Parties
Ciett, its corporate members Adecco, Kelly Services, Manpower, Randstad, USG People, and Olympia Flexgroup, and
UNI Global Union signed the temp agency IFA on October 24,
158
2008. UNI Global Union signed the IFA in representation of
its member unions in the following sectors: agency staff, commerce, electricity, finance, gaming, hair and beauty, graphical,
IT and business services, media and entertainment, postal,
159
property services, social insurance, and telecom.
Ciett is a global organization based in Brussels, Belgium,
160
161
representing temp agencies. It was established in 1967. Its
main goals are to support friendly regulatory environments for
temp agency work and transmit a positive message about said
162
work. As its website states, Ciett’s “main objectives are to
help its members conduct their businesses in a legal and regulatory environment that is positive and supportive and to gain
recognition for the positive contribution the industry brings to
163
better functioning labour markets.” In this manner, Ciett has
a very clear regulatory goal in favor of temp agencies and a
commitment to disseminate a message showcasing the positive
contributions of temp agency work to labor markets.
Ciett has two parallel lines of membership: “national
164
members” and “corporate members.” The website provides:
“Ciett consists of 48 national federations of private employment
agencies and 9 of the largest staffing companies worldwide:
Adecco, Allegis Group, Gi Group, Kelly Group Limited, Kelly
Services, Manpower, Randstad, Recruit Co., LTD. and USG
165
People.” The IFA between UNI and Ciett was signed by most
166
of its corporate members.
158. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 5. Olympia, a signatory of the
IFA, was a German temp agency. However, it went out of business after it
signed the IFA. See, e.g., Olympia Flexgroup Sells Business in a Few European
Countries, UNI GLOBAL UNION (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.uniglobalunion
.org/news/olympia-flexgroup-sells-business-a-few-european-countries.
159. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, at 1 n.1.
160. See CIETT, http://www.ciett.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
161. History & Main Achievements, CIETT, http://www.ciett.org/index.php?
id=34 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
162. See Mission & Objectives, CIETT, http://www.ciett.org/index.php?id=35
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
163. See CIETT, supra note 160.
164. Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, Managing Director, Ciett (July 20, 2012).
165. CIETT, supra note 160.
166. See Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 5.
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Adecco considers itself the largest employment agency in
the world, with over 31,000 in-house employees and around
168
5100 branches in over 60 countries and territories. It states
that on any given day it places 650,000 workers with user
169
firms.
Manpower is another staffing giant, making U.S. $22 bil170
lion in revenue from its staffing operations in 2011. It is
171
based in the United States. It transacts business in over
172
173
eighty countries and has over 3500 offices.
174
Randstad is a Dutch corporation. Its company website
states that it has over 29,000 in-house employees, working in
175
4496 branches. Every day the company places about 581,000
176
people in user firms.
177
Kelly Services is an American firm. It has approximately
8100 in-house employees around the world and placed about
178
540,000 people in user firms in 2013.
179
USG People is a firm based in the Netherlands. According to its website, the company provides employment services

167. According to an Adecco representative, the firm considers itself more
than a temp agency. It considers itself a “private employment agency” that
provides “the full scale of HR solutions.” E-mail from Bettina Schaller, Grp.
Pub. Affairs, Adecco, to author (Sept. 17, 2013, 04:31 CST) (on file with author). The Article refers to Adecco as a “temp agency” for shorthand only.
168. Who We Are and What We Do, ADECCO GRP., http://www.adecco.com/
about/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
169. Id.
170. See ManpowerGroup 2012 Annual Report, MANPOWERGRP. 50 (2013),
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/MAN/2949689866x0x648084/0293B1D4
-61C0-4702-8467-9E60BF4D9344/MAN_Annual_Report_2012.pdf.
171. Id. at 96.
172. About ManpowerGroup, MANPOWERGRP., http://www.manpowergroup
.com/wps/wcm/connect/manpowergroup-en/home/about/#.Uvg_g7Sh6tZ
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2014).
173. Brands, MANPOWERGRP., http://www.manpowergroup.com/wps/wcm/
connect/manpowergroup-en/home/about/brands/#.UvhEP7Sh6tY (last visited
Mar. 25, 2014).
174. See Contact Us, RANDSTAND HOLDING N.V., http://www.randstad
.com/contact-us (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
175. Company Information, RANDSTAD HOLDING N.V., http://www.randstad
.com/about-us/company-information (last visited July 11, 2013).
176. See id.
177. Company Overview, KELLY SVCS. INC., http://www.kellyservices.com/
Global/About-Us/Company_Overview/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
178. See id.
179. About Us, USG PEOPLE, http://www.usgpeople.com/about-us (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
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in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the
180
Netherlands, and Switzerland.
UNI Global Union is a service industry global union based
181
in Nyon, Switzerland.
Its website says that it represents
about twenty million service sector workers around the
182
183
world. It has about 900 affiliated unions in 140 countries.
These unions represent workers in the cleaning and security
sectors, commerce, finance, gaming, graphical and packaging,
hair and beauty, information technologies, media, entertainment and arts, mail and logistics, social insurance, sport, tem184
porary and agency worker, and tourism industries.
2. UNI Signs IFA Accepting a “Positive Role” for Temp Agency
Work
The temp agency IFA recognizes Convention 181 and Rec185
ommendation 188 regarding temp agency work.
The IFA
states that it provides a “framework that allows for the im186
proved functioning of private employment agencies[.]” Many
of the principles in Convention 181 are contained, as we will
187
see, in the temp agency IFA. The IFA then proceeds with the
parties’ pledge to live up to the ILO’s core labor rights. The
temp agency IFA reads: “The signatories to this MoU [Memorandum of Understanding] recognize . . .[t]hat temporary agency work contributes to improve the functioning of labour markets and fulfils [sic] specific needs for both companies and
workers and aims at complementing other forms of employ188
ment[.]”
This language tracks Convention 181, which states that
the ILO is “aware of the importance of flexibility in the func180. Id. The firm realized over €2.8 billion in revenue for 2012, though the
author was unable to find figures regarding the number of workers it places in
user firms. See Press Release, USG People N.V., Transitional Year Strengthens Foundation for the Future (Mar. 1, 2013), http://phx.corporate
-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTczOTY5fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF
8VHlwZT0z&t=1.
181. About Us, UNI GLOBAL UNION, http://www.uniglobalunion.org/about
-us (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
182. Id.
183. See Regions, UNI GLOBAL UNION, http://www.uniglobalunion.org/
regions (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
184. About Us, supra note 180.
185. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 3.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Compare id. with ILO Convention 181, supra note 151.
188. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, at 2.
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tioning of labour markets” and recognizes “the role which private employment agencies may play in a well-functioning la189
bour market[.]. . .” Hence, the temp agency IFA, like Convention 181, recognizes temp agencies as legitimate and useful
labor market actors. As we saw above, it also follows Ciett’s
goal to disseminate positive messages regarding temp agency
work.
Management representatives that the author interviewed
were particularly pleased with the laudatory language in the
190
IFA favoring the industry. Partly because of this language,
191
Ciett called the IFA a “win-win” agreement. Citing the IFA at
length is warranted to better comprehend why temp agencies
were so pleased with their agreement. The relevant language
states that temp agencies contribute to the labor market by:
•
•

•

•
•

•

•

Facilitating fluctuations in the labour market, e.g. the matching of
supply and demand.
Implementing active labour market policies and creating pathways between unemployment and employment by:
o Helping jobseekers entering or re-entering the labour market.
o Helping disadvantaged people entering into the labour
market.
o Providing more work opportunities for more people.
Facilitating the transition between education and work, e.g. by
providing students and young workers with their first access to
professional life and an opportunity to gain work experience.
Facilitating the transition between assignments and jobs by
providing agency workers with vocational training.
Promoting conversion between different types of work contracts,
e.g. by assisting in a transition from a temporary agency contract
to fixed-term or open-ended contracts.
Improving life work balance, e.g. by providing flexible working
time arrangements such as part-time work and flexible working
hours.
192
Helping fight undeclared work.

As we can see, the IFA attempts to provide balanced language
recognizing that regulated temp agency work can find a legitimate place in the labor market to benefit employers and workers. The IFA seems to build on ILO Convention 181 to greater

189.
190.
191.
192.

ILO Convention 181, supra note 151, at 251.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, supra note 64.
Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164.
Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 1.
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detail “the role which private employment agencies may play in
193
a well-functioning labour market.”
Under paragraph two of the temp agency IFA, the parties
194
agreed on regulatory principles to protect workers. The IFA
calls for practices where workers’ rights are not harmed, where
unionization is better safeguarded, and where the worst kinds
of abuses, such as human trafficking, are avoided, among other
195
pledges.
In its paragraph three, the agreement reiterates ILO Con196
vention 181. It also references Recommendation 188 on private agencies, including the provision that calls for no fees to be
197
levied on employees placed by the agencies. The IFA states
the need to protect freedom of association, social dialogue, and
198
attention to employee benefits. Perhaps very importantly, the
temp agencies also pledged not to provide workers to end users
199
who could be used as strike replacements. The temp agency
agreement states: “UNI and Ciett Corporate Members agree
that a regulatory framework on temporary agency work must
include and promote . . . [p]rohibition of the replacement of
striking workers by temporary agency workers without preju200
dice to national legislation or practices.” Ciett and its corporate members pledged not to provide strikebreakers to end users.
In addition, the agreement sets some actions that the parties should take at the national and global levels. At the national level, the parties pledged to eliminate obstacles that
201
make it difficult for temp agencies to operate. The parties also pledged to promote a balanced regulatory system for the
202
agencies and for employees. The parties should attain such
203
goals through social dialogue.
193. ILO Convention 181, supra note 151, at 251.
194. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 1.
195. See id.
196. Id. ¶ 3.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. The exact language reads: “Identify and review obstacles of a legal or
administrative nature which may limit the opportunities for temporary agency
work to operate, and, where appropriate, work with the national governments
to eliminate them.” Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 4.
202. See id.
203. The exact language reads:
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At the global level, the parties pledged to “[w]ork with the
ILO to promote ratification of ILO Convention 181 and the application of Recommendation 188,” and cooperate with interna204
tional organizations to eliminate human trafficking. They also agreed to continue to research the industry and further
improve on “perceptions and conditions for both workers and
205
employers[.]” Finally, the agreement provides guidelines for
implementation, including pledges to disseminate the agreement and meet twice a year to discuss it in a “review commit206
tee” composed of the signatory parties.
3. Trust Facilitated the IFA
At first blush, the temp agency IFA looks extraordinary. It
is a multi-employer agreement and appears to be industrywide. The IFA sets a general framework for UNI, Ciett, and its
corporate members to work together for an agenda to regulate
temp agency work. The parties were able to reach agreement to
sign the IFA as a result of their longstanding prior dealings,
207
which likely have led the parties to establish trust.
Since about 1999, European labor has been trying to establish a regulatory framework for temp agencies in Europe, parReview the need for systems of licensing and inspection and when
relevant, work with the national governments for the introduction of
such systems (which can include financial guarantees), which will
contribute to the development of good industry standards, provided
that such systems are proportional, non- discriminatory and objective
and do not aim at hampering the development of temporary agency
work.
Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. ¶ 5.
207. Prior and current dealings and agreements pertaining to Ciett and
UNI European collaborations seem to have been deemed successful by Ciett
members. For example, a representative of Adecco told me that agreements
between Ciett and UNI “are a testimony to the fact that the Social Dialogue in
our Industry does work!” E-mail from Bettina Schaller, supra note 167. She
mentioned as an example the Joint Eurociett/UNI Europa Recommendations
on Temporary Agency Work Facilitating Transitions in the Labour Market of
2012, which “is aimed at EU policy makers on how to maximise the role of
temporary agency work in facilitating labour market transitions.” Id.; see also
EUROCIETT & UNI EUROPA, JOINT EUROCIETT/UNI EUROPA RECOMMENDATIONS ON TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK FACILITATING TRANSITIONS IN THE LABOUR MARKET (2012), available at http://www.eurociett.eu/fileadmin/
templates/eurociett/docs/Social_dialogue/Transitions_project/
Recommendations/Eurociett_UNI_Europa_-_Joint_recommendations_on_
transitions_-_signed.pdf (recommending how to improve the experience of
temporary workers).
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ticularly during the European Union discussions for a directive
208
on temp agency work. In Europe, the Union of Industrial and
Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE which today is
renamed BUSINESSEUROPE) and the European Centre of
Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of
General Economic Interest (CEEP) represented employers as
“social partners” on all issues regarding labor regulation, in209
cluding temp agency work. However, Ciett came to the fore as
an independent group to represent the temp agency sector dur210
ing European debates in 1999.
UNI Europa, the Europe
branch of UNI, became Ciett’s European department and
211
Eurociett’s labor counterpart. Ciett was generally more willing to make concessions on some issues than UNICE and CEEP
212
had been, such as in the provision of strikebreakers.
The IFA became an extension of what UNI and Ciett had
been doing for Europe, but now for the rest of the world. In this
way, the agreement conforms to the kind of “continuous bargaining model” explained by Professor Egels-Zandén and prior
213
research that has shown the importance of trust for IFAs. In
that particular time when the temp agency IFA was signed, in
2008, Ciett and its corporate members sought to further the le214
gitimacy of temp agency work around the world. UNI was
seeking to find a global regulatory environment for said work
215
and also to organize the sector.

208. See Kerstin Ahlberg, A Story of a Failure—But Also of Success, in
TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR REGULATION: A CASE STUDY OF TEMPORARY AGENCY
WORK 191, 196–97, 207–08, 216, 220 (SALTSA–Joint Programme for Working
Life Research in Eur. ed., 2008) (explaining how Ciett came to the fore in European debates in 1999 to represent the temp agency sector when the European Union attempted to jump-start discussions for a temp agency work legislation. Ciett was generally more willing to make concessions on some issues that
users of temp agency workers did not in order to pursue its goals of gaining a
more friendly regulatory environment for temp agency work and gaining legitimacy as a social partner. One of those concessions included not providing
workers to end users that could use them to replace strikers); see also Emma
L. Jones, Temporary Agency Labour: Back to Square One?, 31 INDUS. L.J. 183,
183–84, 187–88 (2002) (discussing Social Partners’ difficulty agreeing about
the role of temporary workers during negotiations).
209. Ahlberg, supra note 208, at 196, 198.
210. Id. at 196.
211. Id. at 196, 218.
212. Id. at 208.
213. Egels-Zandén, supra note 29, at 538–41.
214. See Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164.
215. See Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64.
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The Ciett representative told the author that UNI approached Ciett to sign the temp agency IFA at a time when it
216
was looking for global acceptance of the industry. Temporary
service firms are generally denounced as anti-worker and antiunion by some labor unions and governments around the world.
Hence, the IFA was intended to be used to gain more global le217
gitimacy for temp agency work.
A representative of Kelly Services told the author a similar
account of why the organization signed the IFA. To paraphrase
the representative’s statement, Kelly Services in particular favored the IFA because UNI Global Union represents workers
218
employed by the sector around the world. The idea behind the
IFA was to send a signal that temp agencies and unions could
work together and discuss issues that concerned both parties,
such as human trafficking and unfair labor practices, which
could be committed by the less ethical companies involved in
219
global staffing work.
Adecco’s representative also voiced a similar reason accounting for the signing of the temp agency IFA, i.e. insufficient
legitimacy of temp agency work. An excerpt from the author’s
notes states as follows: “Adecco is very open to hav[ing] interactions with labor unions because it is looking for recognition
since the industry players [have] a problem with ‘recognition’
220
as social partners.” Adecco’s representative further elaborated on her statement, telling the author that:
Adecco is very open to hav[ing] interactions with labor unions because
it is looking to build the proper regulatory environment to guarantee
worker[s’]’ rights. Despite their efforts, Staffing Industry players have
a problem with recognition as social partners in many countries, so
this [IFA] provided a perfect opportunity to signal that one global la221
bor union partner was willing to mutually move ahead.

Hence, we can conclude that Adecco’s goal was to actively engage with labor unions globally and obtain more legitimacy for
222
temp agency work and for Ciett as a “social partner.”
Similarly, Manpower also was looking for legitimacy in industrial relations at the global level. An excerpt from the au216. Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164.
217. Id.
218. Telephone Interview with Pam Berklich, supra note 64.
219. See id.
220. Telephone Interview with Bettina Schaller, Grp. Pub. Affairs, Adecco
(August 14, 2012).
221. E-mail from Bettina Schaller, supra note 167.
222. Id.
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thor’s notes reads the following way: “[T]he IFA was made possible because UNI Global [Union] started the process with the
position that temporary service employers have something positive to contribute to society (this language was found in the
agreement), and this was tremendously important for the [IFA]
223
to come to fruition.”
Moreover, for Manpower, the parties were binding themselves to work together to find more legitimate spaces for temp
224
agency work. The parties were committing themselves as so225
cial partners. Notes from the author’s interview with the
Manpower representative state: “In this sense, the IFA was different from others because according to [Manpower], other[]
[agreements] are ‘one-sided’ towards the union. Here, the union
226
had to ‘deliver’ as both parties pledged to work together.”
Each party was expected to contribute to the relationship.
UNI shares some of Ciett’s motivations for the IFA. A UNI
representative told the author that the main goal of UNI was to
develop “social dialogue” with temp agencies because temp
227
agency work was becoming more predominant globally. But
UNI also wanted to regulate temp agency work, not just give
228
legitimacy to the sector and to Ciett. According to UNI, many
large employers use agency work to undermine trade union
229
rights. Many industries hire temporary workers to replace
230
core permanent staff. They do it to cut costs, weaken collec231
tive bargaining, union power and density. Given this reality,
UNI felt that it could not just sit on its hands. It had to engage
232
with this global player and seek ways to regulate it.
According to UNI, it was difficult to jump-start discussions
with Ciett because many of its affiliates and other global unions either opposed temp agencies altogether or did not see
233
Ciett as a legitimate partner for social dialogue. However, as
the UNI representative told the author, UNI believed that “if
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, supra note 64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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we wanted to protect workers[,] we had to talk to these
234
firms.”
Moreover, UNI wanted to have a social partner on the side
235
of management, and Ciett became the leading prospect. Perhaps most importantly, UNI also wanted to organize the agen236
cy workers, starting with their in-house staff. We can therefore conclude that UNI’s preexisting relationship with Ciett
was pivotal for the IFA.
Finally, UNI had a goal to cover agency workers with the
237
collective agreements of the relevant user sector. However,
238
this goal was not achieved. Ciett wanted its corporate members to have a collective agreement of their own, so there was
239
no agreement on this point. As we will see below, separate
collective bargaining agreement for temp agencies issue also
became a sticking point for the rest of the global union movement.
To summarize, the temp agency IFA is an entryway into
global social dialogue and industrial relations for Ciett. It also
helped UNI to negotiate ways to better regulate temp agency
work in the sector where it represents workers. UNI’s preexisting relationship with Ciett helped the parties reach the global
240
agreement. The IFA aims to create social dialogue for legislative and regulatory initiatives related to temp agencies. However, as the author will explain below, even this limited goal to
pursue legislative and regulatory changes was at least on partial hold because the global union movement was unwilling to
give Ciett the degree of legitimacy that Ciett expected after
signing the IFA.
4. A Relationship on “Neutral”?
Despite the collaborative language in the temp agency IFA,
Ciett and its corporate members communicated disappointment
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. UNI-Europa, the European branch of UNI, and Eurociett, the European branch of Ciett, had worked together at least since 1999 for European Union legislation on temp agency work, sometimes amidst opposition from other
union and employer associations. Hence, UNI and Ciett have a long relationship where they attempt to work together to pursue common goals. See
Ahlberg, supra note 208, at 196, 200–01, 218–20.
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with the IFA because the response of the global unions’ move241
ment to the IFA was rather cool. Some global unions seem to
have rejected the IFA altogether. Part of the global union backlash that disappointed Ciett included the so-called Global Union Principles on Temporary Work Agencies that, according to
242
Ciett, lacked the “win-win” language contained in the IFA.
These principles were signed by all global unions including
243
UNI. They stated that:
• “The primary form of employment shall be permanent,
open-ended and direct . . . .” 244
• “Agency workers must . . . be covered by all collective bargaining agreements applying to the user enterprise.” 245
• “[Temporary agency workers] must be accorded equal
treatment and opportunities . . . with regular and permanent employees with respect to terms and conditions of
employment.” 246
• The use of temporary agencies should not increase the
gender gap on wages, social protections, and conditions; 247
• “Temporary work agencies must not be used to eliminate
permanent and direct employment relationships . . . .” 248
• The use of agency workers should never be used to weaken
241. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, supra note 64 (explaining political, inter-union conflicts are barring the IFA’s implementation);
Telephone Interview with Pam Berklich, supra note 64 (expressing disappointment with dismissive manner of global unions towards the IFA); Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164 (noting some global unions
questioned the IFA’s ability to really represent the interests of all workers
across all sectors); Telephone interview with Bettina Schaller, supra note 220
(acknowledging it is always easy to find a union that does not support the
temporary work industry).
242. See Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164 (for example, they did not endorse support of the temporary worker industry); see
also Ciett Reacts to Global Unions’ Principles on TAW, supra note 156 (calling
for “further dialogue between the two organisations”).
243. The document containing the principles reads:
Policy positions differ in the trade union movement, both at national
and international levels concerning the use of temporary work agencies. Views vary from total bans on such agencies, to partial bans, to
strict regulation. There are also differences as to on what basis workers should be covered by collective bargaining agreements. However,
there are certain views shared by all Global Unions.
Council of Global Unions, supra note 155 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 3.
245. Id. at 1.
246. Id. at 3.
247. See id. at 4.
248. Id. at 3.
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trade unions or to undermine organizing or collective bargaining rights. 249
The Global Union Principles on Temporary Work Agencies, as
we can see, made explicit reference to the less desirable work
provided by temp agencies and underscored the possibility of
anti-union, gender and other biases and inequalities that agen250
cy work may foment. The laudatory language of temp agency
251
work was absent in the global union principles. Ciett was not
252
pleased by the statements from the global unions.
Moreover, one of the largest global unions, IndustriALL,
publicly scorned Ciett, raising doubts as to whether the global
union gave any legitimacy to Ciett as a social partner for the
fledgling global labor industrial relations system. In its latest
pamphlet on temp agencies it called Ciett part of a “strong industry lobby” that pushed “myths” regarding temp agency
253
work. IndustriALL stated that:
Ciett produces a range of publications that support these objectives and give insight to the arguments the industry uses to gloss over
the negative consequences of agency work and to promote it to employers and governments. Ciett’s characterization of the private employment industry falls far short of the reality experienced by millions
of agency workers worldwide, and by the unions that try to improve
their working conditions.
Ciett bases its claims on narrow surveys of companies almost entirely in the US and western Europe, yet generalizes the claims to en254
compass all agency work worldwide.

Moreover, in its pamphlet against temp agency work,
IndustriALL included a “Ciett Myth Buster” section that listed
255
Ciett’s alleged lies about temp agency work. According to
IndustriALL, these myths were that:
• “Agencies create jobs without substituting permanent
jobs”;256
249. See id. at 2–3.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See Ciett Reacts to Global Unions’ Principles on TAW, supra note 156
(stating “a number of points mentioned in [the] document . . . need to be clarified and/or corrected”).
253. INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL UNION, THE TRIANGULAR TRAP: UNIONS TAKE
ACTION AGAINST AGENCY LABOUR 9–10 (2012), available at http://www
.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Triangular_Trap/
agency_work_final.pdf.
254. Id. at 9.
255. Id. at 9–11.
256. Id. at 10.
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• “Agency work is an effective way of finding permanent
work”; 257
• “Private employment services only contribute to better
labour markets when properly regulated”; 258
• “Private employment services deliver decent work”; 259
[and]
• “In many countries agency work is being recognized as a
lifestyle choice.” 260
Whether or not IndustriALL was correct in its appreciation of
temp agency work, we can clearly see that IndustriALL directly
targeted Ciett as an adversary. IndustriALL’s statements contradicted the temp agency IFA in as much as IndustriALL did
not recognize any positive elements of temp agency work and
261
viewed any positive language about such work as “myths.”
This was a significant contradiction with the letter and the
spirit of the temp agency IFA.
As of November of 2012, when the research here was concluded, UNI did not express the same feelings of disappointment regarding the temp agency IFA that Ciett had expressed,
but it acknowledged that the relationship with Ciett and its
262
corporate members had deteriorated. According to the UNI
representative, the relationship had become neither cooperative
263
nor adversarial but “neutral.” Part of this souring of the relationship was that Ciett and its corporate members believed
that UNI had agreed to support a balanced regulatory envi264
ronment for temp agency work and not to oppose it. UNI does
not believe that signing the Union Global Principles on Tempo265
rary Work Agencies violates the IFA. This different view of
the IFA, at least until November of 2012, generated a stalemate that made it difficult for the parties to implement the IFA
broadly.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
See id. at 9–11.
See Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64.
Id.
See Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, at 3–4.
See Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64.
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IV. DISCUSSION: THE NEED FOR NON-BINDING
ARBITRATION BASED ON ILO NORMS
The previous discussion has shown that IFAs are a product
of trust between parties who have had enduring bargaining relationships. The Volkswagen IFA and Daimler IFA were signed
by German firms and employee representation bodies that have
266
been negotiating issues for many years. Perhaps to the chagrin of American stakeholders in these agreements, German
employee representatives and unions have sided with management over the meaning of freedom of association and what
267
“neutrality” would mean in a U.S. organizing situation. The
Germans have argued that freedom of association principles do
not include card check recognition in the United States, which
is the preferred method of union recognition for most U.S. un268
ions. Differences between unions such as these may endanger
IFAs.
On the other hand, the temp agency IFA seems more
“global.” UNI brokered the IFA and helped obtain pledges from
the temp agencies to abide with ILO norms, including those
pertinent to regulating temp agencies and to ban the provision
of strikebreakers to end users. The agreement was made possible by UNI’s prior engagements with Ciett in European Union
269
discussions for a directive on temp agencies, among others.
However, Ciett was not given the legitimacy it sought as a re270
sult of the IFA. The global unions, including UNI, proclaimed
“principles” of temp agency work that contradict the balanced
271
approach set in the IFA and Convention 181 of the ILO. At
least as of November of 2012, UNI expressed the view that the
272
relationship was not very cordial—“neutral” —while Ciett and
the corporate members were unsure about the progress, if any,
273
that had been made with the IFA.
One way to resolve these disputes over IFA interpretation
is to make the IFAs judicially enforceable and authorize courts
266. Stevis, supra note 69, at 122–25.
267. Interview with Claudia Rahman, supra note 69.
268. Id.
269. See Ahlberg, supra note 208, at 196, 200–01, 218–20.
270. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes242–52 and accompanying text.
272. Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64.
273. See Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, supra note 64; Telephone
Interview with Pam Berklich, supra note 64; Telephone Interview with Denis
Pennel, supra note 164; Telephone Interview with Bettina Schaller, supra note
220.
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to interpret the terms. However, parties may not want to bind
themselves legally. If trust between the parties has been pivotal to create these agreements, parties may be unwilling to formally include strangers such as courts in their relationships.
The parties could, however, be willing to request expert advisory opinions, or non-binding, voluntary arbitration, to resolve interpretation impasses. Therefore, non-binding arbitration
based on ILO norms can help to resolve issues of interpretation.
In fact, at least one IFA, Inditex’s IFA with IndustriALL, has
274
such an arbitration clause. In that IFA, the parties subjected
interpretation issues to advisory opinions of the ILO if the par275
ties could not find agreement. As the Inditex IFA states:
“Questions concerning the interpretation of the Agreement
shall be resolved through consultation between Inditex and
[IndustriALL]. Every effort will be made to find common
agreement but where this is not possible Inditex and
[IndustriALL] will, in appropriate circumstances, seek the ex276
pert advice of the ILO.” Similar advisory opinions, from the
ILO or other neutrals who can base their judgments on ILO
norms, could help the parties find agreement when they exhaust possibilities within bilateral talks. The Article explains
below how the conflicts in the German auto and temp agency
IFAs may be resolved by a neutral arbitrator inspired by ILO
norms.
A. CARD CHECKS? “NO.” EMPLOYER NON-INTERFERENCE AND
MINORITY UNIONS? “YES.”
The ILO has never taken a position on whether card checks
are necessary to protect freedom of association in the United
States, but if it had to do so, it almost certainly would determine that card checks are not necessary to guarantee freedom
of association if U.S. employers refrain from opposing the union
during an organizing attempt. Therefore, non-interference and

274. International Framework Agreement on the Implementation of International Labour Standards Throughout the Inditex Supply Chain, Industria
de Diseño Textil, S.A. (Inditex, S.A.)-The International Textile, Garment and
Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF), Oct. 4, 2007, available at http://www
.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GFAs/Inditex/
inditex-gfa-english.pdf [hereinafter Inditex Agreement]. ITGLWF is
IndustriALL’s predecessor organization. Inditex, INDUSTRIALL (May 5, 2012),
http://www.industriall-union.org/inditex/.
275. Inditex Agreement, supra note 274, at 4.
276. Id.
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union elections, the German automakers’ view of their pledge
277
in the IFAs, meet ILO freedom of association principles.
First, the ILO adheres to the principle of “noninterference,” which has meant that individuals, organizations
and public authorities should not interfere with the rights of
278
association of others.
This should mean, as German automakers, their works councils and the German labor unions
have stated, that employers are obligated under the IFAs not to
279
proactively oppose the union. Agreeing to recognize the union
through a card check would oblige the parties to more than international norms mandate.
The ILO has dealt with the question of union recognition
and how to better determine which labor organizations are
“most representative.” On numerous occasions the ILO has
pronounced the standard to determine union representativeness; it requires “pre-established, precise and objective crite280
ria. . . .”
Such criteria, moreover, can include systems in
which representativeness is evaluated based on the union’s
membership or whether workers vote for their representatives,
or a combination of both. As the Committee on Freedom of Association recently expressed in a case involving the Basque region of Spain:
The Committee wishes to recall, firstly, that Conventions Nos. 87 and
98 are compatible both with systems which foresee union representation, for the exercise of collective trade union rights, based upon the
277. See Daimler IFA, supra note 94; Volkswagen IFA, supra note 105.
278. As Article 2(1) of Convention 98 of the ILO states, “[w]orkers’ and employers’ organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of interference by each other or each others’ agents or members in their establishment, functioning or administration.” Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention, July 1, 1949, Int’l Labor Org. (emphasis added),
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/
---dialogue/documents/publication/wcms_168332.pdf; see also International
Labour Conference, June 8−July 2, 1949, Record of Proceedings, 306, 469,
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09616/09616(1949-32).pdf
(discussing arguments over principle of reciprocal protection); LANCE COMPA,
INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, FREE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: FINDING THE BALANCE, 3 (2013), available at http://www.ituc
-csi.org/IMG/pdf/free_speech_and_freedom_of_association_final-2.pdf.
279. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
280. International Labor Organization [ILO], Rep. of Comm. on Freedom of
Ass’n, (302nd Rep.) Vol. LXXIX, 1996, Series B, No. 1, Case No. 1817 (India)
¶ 325; ILO, Comm. On Freedom of Ass’n, (330th Rep.) Vol. LXXXVI, 2003, Series B, No. 1, Case No. 2132 (Madagascar) ¶ 588; ILO, Comm. On Freedom of
Ass’n, (333rd Rep.) Vol. LXXXVII, 2004, Series B, No. 1, Case No. 2288 (Niger)
¶ 827; ILO, Comm. On Freedom of Ass’n, (336th Rep.) Vol. LXXXVIII, 2005,
Series B, No. 1, Case No. 2334 (Portugal) ¶ 1220.
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degree of actual union membership, as well as with those foreseeing
such union representation on the basis of general ballots of workers
or officials, or, yet again, with systems constituting a combination of
281
both.

Therefore, the Committee on Freedom of Association would find
that the American “card check,” where actual union membership is used to establish a union’s representativeness, is a legitimate instrument to determine the representativeness of an organization. But such a method would not be the only one
sanctioned by the ILO. Elections also would be legitimate instruments to determine a union’s representativeness, as long as
workers are exercising their right to choose freely and without
employer interference. Given ILO jurisprudence, and assuming
that employees can choose their union representatives without
interference through union elections, it would be hard to envision a Committee on Freedom of Association decision stating
that the card check procedure is the only guarantor of freedom
of association in the United States. The Daimler and
Volkswagen IFAs, therefore, abide by ILO norms to the extent
the firms remain “neutral” during a union election, i.e., do not
interfere with workers’ rights to choose their representatives.
Moreover, even though the Committee on Freedom of Association has jurisprudence that would not invalidate the “card
check,” it has stated that the ideal form of verifying representativeness of an organization is through something akin to a secret ballot election supervised by a neutral party. The Committee on Freedom of Association recently declared the following in
a case concerning the ways that India verified a labor organization’s representativeness:
The Committee is of the view that pre-established, precise and objective criteria for the determination of the representativity of workers’
and employers’ organizations should exist in the legislation and such
a determination should not be left to the discretion of governments. The Committee believes that such a determination of ascertaining or verifying the representative character of trade unions can
best be made when strong guarantees of secrecy and impartiality are
offered. Thus, verification of the representative character of a union
should a priori be carried out by an independent and impartial
282
body.

281. ILO, Comm. on Freedom of Ass’n, (320th Rep.) Vol. LXXXIII, 2000,
Series B, No. 1, Case No. 2040 (Spain) ¶ 669.
282. ILO, Rep. of the Committee on Freedom of Association (302nd Rep.)
Vol. LXXIX, 1996, Series B, No. 1, Case No. 1817 (India) ¶ 325 (citation omitted).
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While the Committee on Freedom of Association has not provided that only government-administered union elections, or
NLRB-type elections, are the most desirable, it has stated that
an “independent and impartial” body should carry out a verification process where “secrecy and impartiality” are guaran283
teed. That process, under the American system, seems best
provided by the secret ballot election, to the extent workers
have free choice. Hence, the card check system, while likely to
be legitimate under international standards, may not be the
most optimal under ILO norms.
We want to emphasize that American labor law fails to
meet ILO freedom of association principles. First, it provides
employers with the right to interfere with the employee’s choice
284
to join a union. This issue is being discussed in Canada, a
country that closely follows the American NLRA in many regards and where the Supreme Court of Canada has had to determine if and how Canadian labor law meets freedom of asso285
ciation principles.
One scholar has noted that Canada
infringes upon international freedom of association rights by
excluding union organizers from the workplace during a union286
ization campaign. The almost total exclusion of union organizers from employer property in the United States, which has
been permitted since the U.S. Supreme Court decided
287
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB in 1992, would similarly violate freedom of association principles. But U.S. violations of international labor standards do not stop with the exclusion of union
organizers from the workplace. Employer opposition during
election campaigns, administrative and legal inertia to redress
violations, exclusion of entire categories of workers from coverage such as agricultural workers, inadequate enforcement resources, insufficient remedies for bad faith bargaining, the
283. Id.
284. See LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS 9–10 (2004).
285. David J. Doorey, Union Access to Workers During Organizing Campaigns: A New Look Through the Lens of B.C. Health Services, 15 CAN. LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 1, 12–17, 22–29 (2009) (explaining how Canadian law violates freedom of association principles because it lets employers exclude union organizers from workplaces); see also Health Servs. and Support-Facilities Subsector
Bargaining Ass’n v. B.C., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 ¶¶ 70, 79 (Can.) (stating that
Canadian labor law should provide the same level of protection as ILO Convention 87, which Canada has ratified).
286. Doorey, supra note 285, at 12–17.
287. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
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permissibility of permanent strike replacements, among other
things, make the American NLRA fall short of meeting interna288
tional norms. In fact, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association has found the United States to be in likely violation of
freedom of association principles because it fails to provide effective collective bargaining rights in the public sector and because it denies freedom of association rights to graduate stu289
dents who work for universities.
U.S. labor law is not a
290
bastion for workers’ free association.
Employers who have signed on to IFAs should also recognize “minority unions,” which are labor unions that lack major291
ity support. Such labor organizations would represent only
292
their members. Employers who do not recognize bargaining
rights of employees simply because the union lacks majority
support eviscerate freedom of association rights. The ILO has
been clear that minority unions should have the right to bargain with employers when there is no majority union or formal
293
union in place. As the Freedom of Association Committee of
the ILO has stated:
288. See COMPA, supra note 284, at 9; see also David S. Weissbrodt & Matthew Mason, Compliance of the United States with International Labor Law,
98 MINN. L. REV. 1842 (2014).
289. ILO, Rep. of Committee on Freedom of Association (362nd Rep.), 2011,
Case No. 2741 (United States), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:50002:0::NO::P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:
2912150; Id. at (350th Rep.), 2008, Case No. 2547 (United States), available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_
COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2910631; Id. at (344th Rep.), 2007, Case No. 2460
(United States), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:
50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2909835; Id. at (343rd
Rep.), 2006, Case No. 2292 (United States), available at http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_
ID:2908140.
290. See JAMES A. GROSS, A SHAMEFUL BUSINESS: THE CASE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 96–103 (2010).
291. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 88 (2005).
292. Id.
293. Recommendation 91 of the ILO states the following:
For the purpose of this Recommendation, the term collective agreements means all agreements in writing regarding working conditions
and terms of employment concluded between an employer, a group of
employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand,
and one or more representative workers' organisations, or, in the absence of such organisations, the representatives of the workers duly
elected and authorised by them in accordance with national laws and
regulations, on the other.
ILO Recommendation (No. 91), Collective Agreements Recommendation (June
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Problems may arise when the law stipulates that a trade union must
receive the support of 50 per cent of the members of a bargaining unit
to be recognized as a bargaining agent: a majority union which fails to
secure this absolute majority is thus denied the possibility of bargaining. The Committee considers that under such a system, if no union
covers more than 50 per cent of the workers, collective bargaining
rights should be granted to all the unions in this unit, at least on be294
half of their own members.

ILO norms cannot be clearer about the right of minority unions
where there is no majority bargaining agent available. Therefore, while IFA signatories need not recognize unions through
card checks, they still should recognize a minority of workers
who want to bargain collectively with the employer.
Professor David Doorey has made precisely this kind of
suggestion to help Canada conform to international labor
norms and its own Charter, which guarantees the right to col295
lective bargaining. Canadian labor law, as American labor
law, leaves millions of Canadian workers bereft of collective
bargaining right because it sanctions the right only when there
296
is a legally-sanctioned, majority union. Professor Doorey has
argued that Canadian employers should recognize minority unions when “thicker” rights are unavailable under the strictures
297
of Canadian labor law. Recognition of minority unions for
members only would bring Canada closer to meeting ILO
298
norms.
In conclusion, an arbitrator following the spirit of ILO
norms would likely find that the German industrial relations
parties are correct in their interpretation of the IFAs’ freedom
29, 1951) (emphasis added); see also ILO Freedom of Association 2006 Digest,
¶ 944 and cases cited therein.
294. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: International Labour Conference 81st Sess., 1994, International Labour Office, Geneva, Switz.,
Rep. III (Part 4B) ¶ 241.
295. David J. Doorey, Graduated Freedom of Association: Worker Voice Beyond the Wagner Model, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. 511, 513–14, 521 (2013).
296. Id. at 536–37.
297. Id.
298. Id. (citing Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: International Labour Conference 81st Sess., 1994, International Labour Office, Geneva, Switz., Rep. III (Part 4B) ¶ 241 and Mark Harcourt & Helen Lam, NonMajority Union Representation Conforms to ILO Freedom of Association Principles and (Potentially) Promotes Inter-Union Collaboration: New Zealand Lessons for Canada, 34 DALHOUSIE L.J. 115, 119–20 (2011)); see also ROY J.
ADAMS, LABOUR LEFT OUT: CANADA’S FAILURE TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A HUMAN RIGHT 28–40 (2006) (explaining how
Canadian labor law should recognize minority unions in the absence of majority unions to comply with international labor standards).

2014]

SOFT MEANS AND HARD CHALLENGES

1799

of association clause. The most adequate process for union
recognition is one where the employer does not interfere with
the workers’ right to choose union representatives and where
workers choose through secret ballot elections administered by
a neutral party. However, an arbitrator should add that workers have the right to bargain collectively with the signatory
employers, in representation only of themselves, when a majority of the employees do not support the union. Non-binding arbitration inspired by ILO norms would thus give and take from
both sides, labor and management, in this issue regarding union recognition in the United States. Perhaps neither side will
be completely happy with such a compromise, but such a compromise is better than a stalemate. In any case, concrete
knowledge of how international labor standards would be used
to interpret the IFA may create further incentives that compel
the parties to agree over union recognition rules under the IFA.
B. THE TEMP AGENCY IFA AND THE GLOBAL UNION PRINCIPLES
ON TEMPORARY WORK AGENCIES ARE INCOMPATIBLE
Ciett is concerned by UNI’s alleged failure to support temp
agency work. Ciett alleges UNI’s consent to the Global Union’s
Principles on Temporary Work Agencies violates UNI’s IFA obligations. Ciett is likely correct.
The IFA has laudatory language regarding temp agency
work. Convention 181 of the ILO regarding temp agency work
contains similar, positive language regarding temp agency
299
work. The Convention does not ban temp agency work but, as
Ciett has argued, and as the IFA advocates, it provides temp
agency work should be regulated to make it work for all the
parties involved. Therefore, the Global Union Principles on
Temporary Work Agencies are at odds with the spirit of Convention 181 of the ILO and the temp agency IFA. UNI should
distance itself from one-sided language that mostly condemns
temp agency work.
However, Ciett and UNI are not the only social partners
relevant for discussions regarding temp agency work. Convention 181 calls on member states to consult with the “most rep300
resentative” employer and employee organizations to deter-

299. See ILO, Convention 181, supra note 151, at pmbl.
300. The term “most representative” organization is likely to have come to
being in international labor law when the ILO was founded and its Constitution was drafted. The ILO Constitution states:
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mine what a temp agency covered by the convention is; exclude certain workers from coverage or ban agency work alto302
gether in certain branches of economic activity; determine the
303
legal status of temp agencies; establish exceptions to the genThe Members undertake to nominate non-Government delegates and
advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial organisations, if
such organisations exist, which are most representative of employers
or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries.
ILO CONSTITUTION, art. 3(5).
Normally, the most representative organizations are the employer and
employee organizations that represent the most number of employers or employees, in a relative or absolute sense, in a given country. The ILO did not
develop a more specific definition of the term because at the time international
organizations attempted to be more inclusive and tried not to exclude particular groups. Faina Milman-Sivan, The Virtuous Cycle: A New Paradigm for
Democratizing Global Governance Through Deliberation, 30 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 801, 816 (2009). Professor Milman-Sivan further explains as follows:
Due to the complexity of the Credential Committee’s task, the Council
of the League of Nations requested an advisory opinion from the Permanent Court of International Justice, in order to clarify the content
of Article 3(5). This opinion, issued in 1922, established the foundation for interpreting this constitutional provision and the basis for
subsequent precedents. “Organizations” in this context was construed
by the Permanent Court of International Justice to permit the inclusion of multiple organizations. The Court rejected the contention of
the Netherlands Confederation of Trade Unions that it was the most
representative trade union organization in the country, and did not
give its consent to the nomination of the non-governmental delegates.
The Government of the Netherlands preferred to consult three other
trade organizations that together constituted the most representative
organizations.
Id. at 816 n.62 (citations omitted).
Different countries also have different ways to determine “most representative status.” In Spain, for example, “most representative status” unions
are those that represent at least ten percent of the national workforce or fifteen percent of a sub-national division, known in Spain as “communities.” See
Spain: Most Representative Union, EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa
.eu/emire/SPAIN/MOSTREPRESENTATIVEUNION-ES.htm (last visited Mar.
25, 2014). A similar rule applies to establish the most representative employer
organization. See Spain: Most Representative Employers’ Association,
EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/SPAIN/MOSTREPRESE
NTATIVEEMPLOYERSASSOCIATION-ES.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014)
(explaining about the most representative employer in Spain). In Italy, the
most representative labor organizations are the ones that meet certain criteria, including some related to membership, presence in a broad range of occupational categories, presence throughout national territory, active participation in handling labour disputes and ability to bargain for its members. See
Italy: Most Representative Union, EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa
.eu/emire/ITALY/MOSTREPRESENTATIVEUNION-IT.htm (last visited Mar.
25, 2014).
301. ILO Convention 181, supra note 151, at art. 1(c).
302. Id. at art. 2(4)(a), (b).
303. Id. at art. 3(1).

2014]

SOFT MEANS AND HARD CHALLENGES

1801

eral ban on fees paid by workers to temp agencies under the
304
Convention; and provide protections to migrant workers un305
der the Convention. The most representative employee organizations also need to be involved in the investigation of complaints regarding abuses and violations of workers’ rights by
306
temp agencies and to provide better cooperation between pub307
lic and private employment agencies. Assuming that most
workers in any given economy are employed directly by user
firms, the only or most relevant representatives for temp agency work are not Ciett and UNI, unless UNI represents the permanent employees of the relevant sector. The user firms and
their management and labor organizations can and should form
part of such consultations.
Given the plurality of social partners involved in the regulation of temp agency work, we should expect divergent voices
including IndustriALL’s. UNI and Ciett should try to persuade
other social partners of perspective temp agency work and stir
other social partners closer to their position.
Therefore, an arbitrator inspired by ILO norms would likely conclude that UNI should distance itself from one-sided
statements critical of temp agency work. While a non-binding
opinion from a neutral third party cannot be used to compel
UNI Global from rescinding its support of the Global Unions’
Principles on Temporary Work Agencies, it can become a powerful tool to “shame” and cajole the global union to comply with
its commitments. This said, neither Ciett nor UNI are exclusive
social partners for the regulation of temp agency work. Different views on the role of agency work on the labor market may
be voiced by other global industrial relations players. The parties will need to work together to bring other social partners
closer to their own viewpoint on this issue.
CONCLUSION: FURTHER RESEARCH AND THE
PROMISE OF IFAS
Labor unions are losing members and influence across the
world’s developed, capitalist democracies. The post-World War
II social contract seems to have ended. However, the decline of
unions in the developed, capitalist democracies is occurring at a
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at art. 7(2).
Id. at art. 8(1).
Id. at art. 10.
Id. at art. 13.
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time when global labor seems to be growing. IFAs, a product of
global labor, now cover about nine million workers worldwide,
excluding contractors. IFAs have been the product of longstanding bargaining relationships between multi-national companies
and particular labor actors. In the case of German auto, the
Global Works Councils’ relationships with the companies made
the IFAs possible. In the case of the temp agency IFA, UNI
Global’s longstanding relationship with Ciett enabled the IFA.
But this exploratory study has shown that fundamental
differences may surface between the signatory parties and other stakeholders. In auto, we saw how freedom of association
principles fail to include the American unions’ preferred method of union recognition, the card check. German industrial relations representatives and American unions differ on this issue.
In the temp agency IFA, we saw how UNI Global signed the
Global Unions Principles of Temporary Work, which contradicted the balanced approach to temp agency work it agreed to
support in the IFA, likely in violation of its commitments. Such
fundamental differences could significantly halt the effective
use of IFAs.
The parties and their stakeholders could solve their disagreements through non-binding arbitration based on ILO
norms. The IFAs incorporate the ILO’s standards; the parties
have agreed to them. Moreover, international labor standards
seem neutral enough to provide a balanced resolution to practical interpretation issues under the IFAs. Further research of
how parties are resolving interpretation issues of their IFAs,
including those parties who have included arbitration clauses,
non-binding or otherwise, will help us to better ascertain the
effectiveness of arbitration in IFAs.
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APPENDIX: LIST OF INDIVIDUALS THE AUTHOR
INTERVIEWED FOR THIS ARTICLE
Interviewed in Person
Interview with Wolfgang Fueter, Volkswagen Group Human Resources International, in Wolfsburg, Germany (Sept. 21,
2012).
Interview with Helmut Lense, Director of Automotive and
Rubber, IndustriALL Global Union, Geneva, Switzerland (July
11, 2012).
Interview with Thomas Metz, Staff of the General Works
308
Council, Daimler AG, in Stuttgart, Germany (Sept. 4, 2012).
Interview with Frank Patta, Works Council Member of the
Volkswagen Group, in Wolfsburg, Germany (Sept. 21, 2012).
Interview with Claudia Rahman, International Department, IG Metall, in Frankfurt, Germany (Sept. 3, 2012).
Interview with Robert Steiert, retired I.M.F. (today
IndustriALL) and IG Metall union officer, in Zurich, Switzerland (July 10, 2012).
Interviewed by Telephone
Telephone Interview with Pam Berklich, Senior Vice President, Kelly Services (Oct. 8, 2012).
Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, Legal Representative, Manpower, Inc. (July 19, 2012).
Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, Policy Officer,
Temporary Services Agency Branch, UNI Global Union (July
13, 2012).
Telephone Interview with Denis Patel, Managing Director,
CIETT (July 20, 2012).
Telephone Interview with Bettina Schaller, Public Affairs
Specialist, Adecco (Aug. 14, 2012).
Individuals Who Only Answered E-mail Questions for
this Article
Kristin Dziczek, Center for Automotive Research (May 8,
2013).
308. This interview is used to corroborate general facts and is not cited in
this article.
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Organizations that Refused to Participate in this Study
or that Failed to Respond to the Author’s Queries
Daimler management (information obtained through secondary sources).
United Auto Workers (information obtained through secondary sources).

